Lebanese Christian nationalism: A theoretical analyses of a national movement

A Masters Thesis

Presented by

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This thesis examines the distinctiveness of Lebanese Christian identity, and the creation of two interconnected narratives pre and during the civil war: the secular that rejects Arab nationalism and embraces the Phoenician origins of the Lebanese, and the marriage of the concepts of dying and fighting for the sacred land and faith. This study portrays the Lebanese Christian national movement as a social movement with a national agenda struggling to disseminate its conception of the identity of a country within very diverse and hostile societal settings. I concentrate on the creation process by the ethnic entrepreneurs and their construction of the self-image of the Lebanese Christian and the perception of the "other" in the Arab world. I study the rhetoric of the Christian intelligentsia through an examination of their writings and speeches before, during and after the civil war, and the evolution of that rhetoric along the periods of peace and war. I look at how the image of “us” vs. the “other” has evolved with the changing societal and political structures as a national movement evolved into an armed resistance.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I dedicate this thesis to my country Lebanon:

The land of the cedar, the land of coexistence, the land of peace... the land of terror, of arms, of blood…the land where all is above the law, the land of thugs, the land of the weak state that gets terrorized by its militias...the land of the powerful, power of fear, power of identity, power of sectarianism… the land of the trade and commerce, trade in the sacred, trade in the souls, trade in the minds...I say pity this land and pity this nation.

I would like to thank Professor Amílcar Antonio Barreto that patiently guided my work and invested his time into my project. His passion for his career and enthusiasm for my thesis gave me the courage and confidence to complete this task.

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Introduction:

The creation of the territorial state in Lebanon was not accompanied by an ethos of a unitary nation-state. The structure of the state was built in order to maintain its weakness in relation to society. Ironically, the movement that institutionalized confessionalism as a political system did not anticipate that they were creating a structure that would hamper their efforts at promulgating their version of the national identity. As the state, through the confessional system, was denied the power to exercise social control over its society, it has been further weakened by its inability to mitigate amongst its strong and ideologically divided society. The Lebanese society is made up of sectarian, communal, clan like groupings, each holding a differing conception of the identity of the state and its function in relation to its societal schisms. The Lebanese state had a low degree of "stateness" and was dependent on communal forces within the society; social control within the society was fragmented and has reflected its fragmentation on the character of the State. The Lebanese state's weakness took its most exaggerated form when it failed to stop the armament of its citizens by non-governmental forces each claiming to be defending the sovereignty of the state when in fact each was placing a nail in the coffin of the state.

The study of nationalism, with Lebanon as a case study, cannot be state centered as conceptions of nationalism lie within the perception of the divided society over their dichotomous definitions of the identity and function of the state. In the case of Lebanon one cannot study nationalism, but nationalisms, as each group has a separate national narrative, collective memory, and active intelligentsia. In this study, I chose the Christian Maronite national movement that I portray as a social movement that succeeded at creating a legal territorial state, yet failed at generating a unitary national narrative of the state, and trapped itself

within an uncompromising radical interpretation of the identity of Lebanon; as the "other" gained military strength within the Lebanese territory, it was necessary for a conceptual social movement to militarize its ranks in a battle for the identity of the state. The narrative that contained Christian elements before the war when the Maronites enjoyed control over the state, radicalized its rhetoric and married nationalism with Christianity at the beginning of the war as they began to loose that control, and launched the battle for "our" Lebanon. The literature of this study joins three theoretical discussions that serve to explain the peculiarity of Lebanese Christian nationalism, as the nationalism literature provides the constructivist framework for building a national narrative assuming a unitary nation state, the state literature debates the weakness of the state when overpowered by a strong society with hegemonic powers, and finally the social movement literature situates the strategy and struggle of national movements within a structural system that prevents them from articulating their narrative beyond the imagined borders of its claimants. The body will present an analysis of the conditions of the creation of modern Lebanon, the Maronite project for creating a homeland for the Christians, the confessional system and the weakness of the Lebanese state, the articulation of Phoenicia as historical Lebanon by the Christian ethnic entrepreneurs, the imagining of a linguistically peculiar westward looking nation with a Christian mission, the sanctification of the land and the rootedness of a community, defining Arabism and Islam as the "other" of the Christian nation, Maronite collective memory, the national expression of religiosity, the Palestinian factor and the militarization of the Christian street, the radicalization of the Christian narrative and the mobilization for collective militant action through religious symbolism, the vendettas within the movement, its failure at grabbing the state and the language of victimization post the civil war.

Chapter One: Literature Review

The aim of this chapter is to explore the theoretical debate around the birth of social movements with national ideologies and agendas, that exist within a structural system that does not permit the hegemony of one narrative over the other. Nationalism literature is generally studied within the context of the nation-state, as the nationalist ideology could begin as an ethnic movement and create an independent state, or the state could bring together diverse ethnicities, and thus create a unifying national narrative that constructs and educates collective emotional legitimacy for the nation. This literature review will attempt to reconcile the nationalism and social movement literature as the case study at hand involves a national movement that created a state yet failed to generate an "us" that transcends religious identification and thus failed at creating a nation state, as the different groups coexisting within the nation remained a collective of ethno-religious gatherings within a political system that collapses if or when one groups attempts to overpower the others. Failing to nationalize their ideology positioned the national movement in a continual state of resistance.

In order to understand the peculiarities of national movements that fail at creating a nation state, I begin this study by examining the nationalism literature through exploring the modernity of the nation and the creation process of its narrative and collective ideology. I will study the significant role of ethnic entrepreneurs in this process as they determine the cultural means and tools of oneness generation, establish the language of the state in relation to its society, resurrect or bury a collective memory that serves as the common glue that maintains the cohesiveness of the social fabric, and articulate the relationship of "us" and "them". Next I will discuss the weakness of the state in relation to strong societies that hold the tools to impose their hegemonic

ideals, as the former fails at establishing social control and at adopting a unifying national agenda. Strong and diverse societies extract the hegemonic power from the weak state and establish their independent narratives that compete in the spatial market while denying the state the power to unify these agendas and create a unifying national narrative. The final section will examine national social movements that sustain a campaign, in a continual state of resistance to the competing narratives, as their claimants construct a group narrative and memory, and constantly manipulate the emotive needs of belonging, to generate collective action.

Nations and nationalism:

In this study I will take the rationalist approach that adheres to the constructionist school and studies the concepts of nations and nationalism as “imagined”, “invented” and “constructed” social artifacts and political phenomena (Anderson: 1991; Gellner: 1983; Hobsbawn and Ranger: 1983); this school of thought contradicts with the “primordialists” that view these concepts as natural products of the human identification with the collective. Nations, through the eyes of the nationalists, are the final and most organic gatherings in human history; they have come to acquire a significant “emotional legitimacy”, the rationality of which scholars have been attempting to understand (Anderson: 1991: 4). Anderson (1991) in his *Imagined communities* defined the nation as “an imagined political community” (6). He argued that all communities are imagined, including the religious, given their largeness. He refuses the categorization of human gatherings beyond the “primordial village” as natural or “true” (Anderson: 1991: 6).

As individuals are born and raised into our modern world, they come to identify with a certain set of characteristics be it a religion, a sect, an ethnicity, a race, a language, a territorial space, etc. They come to belong to an identifiable “us”, which could be defined through a limited geographical region, an imagined sovereign entity, a political ideology, a family, etc. They could

come to identify with multiple elements that are not mutually exclusive. One person could identify simultaneously with his country, his community, his sect and his family. Rationalists, like Anderson (1991) and Gellner (1983), would argue that any and every community or nation are "imagined" as it is not possible for any one person to know all the members of his or her community outside the perimeters of a small village. A person's family, local religious house of worship, small town or village are organic spaces where one person could belong and identify as an innate part. The modern nation, through the narrative of nationalism, asks the individual to be part of an "us" that is beyond the ability of any one person to comprehend. It demands that the individual relinquishes all the primordial associations and to adhere to "us" the nation. Nationalism's success has depended on the creation process of a national narrative that generates an overwhelming "emotional legitimacy" from the targeted population (Anderson: 1991).

Ethnic entrepreneurs, according to the rationalists, play a major role in this creation process of the "imagined community" and its narrative (Anderson: 1981; Barreto: 2009; Hobsbawn and Ranger: 1983). They revive the past, politicize the myth, invent traditions, determine the educational agenda, reinvent cultural tools that serve to unify the nation, control its collective emotions, and secure its loyalty (Hobsbawn and Ranger: 1983; Barreto: 2009; Khalidi: 1997). Barreto (2009) says it best in his *Nationalism and its logical foundations:* "Ethnic entrepreneurs employ tangible cultural features as if they were stones to build a national identity's outer shell, or public face" (27).[1] The role of the ethnic entrepreneurs, be it thinkers, political leaders or government officials, is to "objectify" a preexisting culture and re-invent its history, traditions,

[1] Gellner (1983) reminds us in *Nations and nationalism* to not place all our faith in the human agent and the "power" of "philosophers" and that nationalism is the product of our modern "social conditions" (120); It is the industrial society's new division of labor that has required a new kind of social control as the literate, egalitarian and educated society could not be managed on a local level and required the creation of a national political organization, the state, that works alongside a national education system to legitimize its control of the masses.

costumes, literature, symbols, etc. for the sake of "nation building" under a unified set of cultural norms (Gellner: 1983: 47; Handler: 1988: 13, 14).

National identity is a "dynamic entity" that undergoes changes along its historical path and social, political and economic structures (Massad: 2001: 4, 5). Nations and their political manifestations operate within international, regional, national and local structures that condition their expressive capabilities and resources, and hence affect their abilities to "monopolize the legitimate means of discipline" (Massad: 2001: 4). Nationalism should be studied through the structuralist, the culturalist and the rationalist paradigms, without neglecting the "objectification" that culture undergoes as a tool of agencies and human agents within the nation building process. The successful rationalist studies are those that have thickened their research with exploring the institutions and the structural conditions on the choices of the rational actors, and that would recognize that actors belong to a culture that shapes their collective belief and gets reinvented as a fusion tool throughout the creation process (Lichbach: 1997: 259; Handler: 1988: 13, 14). Ethnic entrepreneurs must take the larger part in the study of nation creation and nationalism, without excluding the structures, conditions and systems of meanings within which they operate. The intellectual body transforms cultural symbols and images into politicized material that targets the collective memory of the population to generate sympathy and emotive sentiments (Danforth: 1995; Zerubavel: 1995). The narrative creation process is a "dialectic" between the intellectuals, the state and the target population (Danforth: 1995: 18); homogeneous and harmonious nation-states are the product of a successful interaction between the three parties. State agents and social entrepreneurs have the challenge of appealing to the sentiment of the targeted population and to get it to embrace the national narrative (Danforth: 1995). Political identity is a rational choice made by individuals as a mean to increase their emotive and material

benefit (Barreto: 2009); while the state has the advantage through its national educative and legal system, to inculcate nationalism, it cannot enforce national sentiment and the individual's will to die for the nation, when it competes for the loyalty of individuals with national movements that create narratives closest to the individual's "picture of the past" and provide a better system of emotive and material benefits (Zerubavel: 1995; Danforth: 1995).

The narrative creation process:

Imagined communities create romanticized narratives from the past and symbols of what becomes sacred for the nation (Anderson: 1991; Zerubavel: 1995). They come to perceive themselves as a sacred or chosen nation, and hence view their territory as sacred and worthy of dying for; they could also increase their legitimacy by placing God on their side of the battlefield (Zerubavel: 1995; Ranger: 1983). Nationalism transfers the language of continuity from the religious realm to the secular; the martyr that died for "us" gets immortalized in the memory of the nation and gets manifested through the national yearly celebrations and memorials that remind the members of the imagined community of the shared fate, and that display the ultimate reward for those who give it all (Anderson: 1991; Zerubavel: 1995; Barreto: 2009). Nations give themselves the power to categorize the dead as they define in their narrative what act grants its actor the title of a national hero (Zerubavel: 1995).

Death plays an important role in the process of imagining a nation; the dead get glorified for their human sacrifices for the sake of the community or nation (Anderson: 1991).[2] An "ourness" gets created where the dead man becomes "our young man" so as to impose grief on a nation as one that would befall a family that lost its young man (Anderson: 1991: 32). This rhetoric of the nation as a large family is at the essence of the immense power that nationalism has generated.

[2] "No more arresting emblems of the modern culture of nationalism exists that cenotaphs and tombs of Unknown Soldiers" (Anderson: 1991: 9).

Every dead hero is the son of every weeping mother and the brother of every proud patriot. Ethnic entrepreneurs have used the convenient absence of the dead, often referred to as the martyrs, to call on the nations for action (Anderson: 1991: 198); the dead are often perceived as looking down on their fellow patriot with messages of praise or disappointment. Wars and revolutions are waged in the name of those who can't: "our" dead.

Like communities and nations, traditions that culturalists take for granted are creations that might or might not have origins in the past of that imagined nation (Hobsbawn: 1983; Zerubavel: 1995). They often lack continuity with the history of a people and are the construct of social entrepreneurs. "Inventing traditions, it is assumed here, is essentially a process of formalization and ritualization, characterized by reference to the past, if only by imposing repetition" (Hobsbawn: 1983: 4). This approach perceives that the process of creation is carefully fabricated by "those whose function it is to do so" (Hobsbawn: 1983: 13); "those" being the elite, the intellectuals, the religious leaders, the strongmen of communities etc. Traditions and ideas that serve the unification of the community/nation get adopted, while those that could undermine the myth creation get lost somewhere along the line; it becomes harder to distinguish between the facts and the myths as the social entrepreneur's ideas get adopted by a political umbrella that invests in the promulgation of the myths (Gellner: 1983; Zerubavel: 1995).[3]

Yael Zerubavel (1995) in *Recovered roots: Collective memory of the making of Israeli national tradition* quotes the French scholar Pierre Nora's saying on collective memory as he describes it as "in permanent evolution, open to the dialectic of remembering and forgetting, unconscious of its successive deformations, vulnerable to manipulation and appropriation,

[3] Anderson (1991) reminds us of the words of the French philosopher Ernest Renan that while nations share memories, they also share a common amnesia: *"…que tous les individus aient beaucoup de choses en commun et aussi que tous aient oublié des choses…"* (199).

susceptible to being dormant and periodically revived" (4). This quote highlights the standing of collective memory under the different conditions that it weathers, and the manner human agents manipulate history for the purpose of serving the present agenda by featuring some aspects of the past and sweeping others under the rug. The past and history face a selective process of adoption and exploitation (Zerubavel: 1995; Hobsbawn and Ranger: 1983).

As the invented collective memory serves to sustain the position of the ruling elite of the national movement, a counter-memory could develop with the purpose of undermining the master commemorative narrative and the legitimacy of the elite (Zerubavel: 1995: 10, 11). The counter-memory could originate from the inside or the outside of the movement with a conflicting interpretation of the past and a differing set of commemoratives and systems of meanings and symbols (Zerubavel: 1995; Khalidi: 1997).[4] Arabs and Israelis have created two separate narratives from the past of the same land, each zooming in on the era that would glorify its group and legitimize its existence and belittle the other's history (Khalidi: 1997). Jerusalem became the space where the symbolic war of the two narratives clashes as each chooses to use the name that fits its master narrative; *Yerushalaim* for the Israelis is *al-Quds* for the Arabs (Khalidi: 1997: 14).

The Israelis and the Palestinians have imagined two conflicting nations on the same land, and provide a case in point to the notion that nations are modern creations. Both have based the narrative of their national consciousness on rootedness to the land and a history of persecution and injustice, yet their narratives differ in that the group with a powerful state emphasizes the episodes of victory, and invents them when necessary, whereas the dispersed group with no

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[4] The Zionist secular narrative faced a counter-narrative from the inside by the Israeli religious movement that rejected the secularization of Jewish history and traditions (Zerubavel: 1995), and by the Palestinian narrative of resistance (Khalidi: 1997).

centralized political power emphasizes unity through perpetual struggle and resistance (Zerubavel: 1995; Khalidi: 1997). Rashid Khalidi (1997) in *Palestinian identity: the construction of modern national consciousness,* communicates the modernity of nation creation and national consciousness through the example of Palestinian national identity.[5] Palestinian national consciousness and the unity of fate as a people did not develop until Palestinians realized the shared "dispossession" and "expulsion" from their land (Khalidi: 1997: 193). Their identity went through what Khalidi called a "genesis" as their loyalties and identifications went from the family, the village, the religion, and the ethnic; Islamism and Arabism competed with a secular localized and internalized Palestinian narrative of peculiarity of our experience and fate as a victimized population willing to resist, sacrifice and pay the highest price (Khalidi: 1997). Failure within the Palestinian narrative was transformed into a narrative of triumph of a heroic resilient people that does not surrender (Khalidi: 1997).

The illusion of continuity is important for nations as they strive to obtain legitimacy from the members of the nation themselves and from the others; the past becomes the space that intellectuals traverse seeking to find the roots of the nation (Hobsbawn: 1983; Zerubavel: 1995). That continuity is rarely linear yet it gets wrapped and presented to the masses as such (Zerubavel: 1995). Those customs that once belonged to the realm of the religious get adopted by the nation and get transformed from reverence to God, to reverence to the nation and the motherland (Hobsbawn: 1983; Zerubavel: 1995). National emblems, the flag, the national anthem, among others, become sanctified objects and moments, which demand respect and deference from the patriots (Hobsbawn: 1983; Danforth: 1995). "Commemoration" of the significant events gives the narrative a sense of continuity and historical legitimacy (Zerubavel:

[5] Khalidi (1997) presents the multiple non-mutually exclusive loyalties of the Arab Palestinians during and after the beginning of Zionist settlements.

1995: 6, 7). History gets selectively exploited to serve the narrative national and fire the national sentiments of the people; history "undergoes the process of narrativization" (Zerubavel: 1995: 6).[6]

The secular and the religious: the land and the faith

Religion was the realm of belonging pre-nation state and was at the religious community was the imagined political structure that joined the subject with sovereign, and generated the domain of political identification (Anderson: 1991; Geary: 2002). It still exists, in the age of nationalism, as a strong form of assimilation and loyalty generation (Anderson: 1991). Nationalism, like religious communities, creates a set of "shared symbols" such as the "sacred language" and the "sacred community" or the "chosen people" (Anderson: 1991: 12,13; Zerubavel: 1995). Prior to the creation of the territorial state, religion was the realm where communities were imagined; as the faithful got "territorialized", the nation became the new realm of social control and the space for the creation of "shared symbols" (Anderson: 1991: 18,19).

Religion is the oldest and most valuable tool of control in the realm of politics and social entrepreneurs have utilized some group's strong identification with religion to target the expressive needs of individuals (Wood: 2003; Schuessler: 2000). Religious texts and meanings have the potential to be utilized in the creation of a resistance language and eventually action (Wood: 2003). Participation at the highest cost becomes a duty towards fellow men and God

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[6] Hugh Trevor-Roper (1983) in *The invention of tradition: The Highland tradition of Scotland*, describes how the Kilt got transformed from a symbol of barbarism to a national symbol of Scottish tribal pride; the Scottish ethnic entrepreneurs were attempting to construct cultural independence for the Scots in their struggle for territorial independence and separation from England (15, 16, 68). In their attempt to achieve legitimacy for their struggle as a nation, it was necessary to invent a non-existent culture borrowing from cultural traditions that had yet to be claimed and adopted by any other group. It is also interesting to note that members of the ruling class that adopted it as a dress style popularized the trend of kilt (Hugh Trevor-Roper: 1983: 24).

(Wood: 2003).[7] With the birth of nations in collectives with high religious identification, that identification gets transformed from "faith to culture" and in some cases gets transfused with the identity of the state (Gellner: 1983: 70); in other words it gets secularized and nationalized. Israel is a Jewish state and the Israelis, whether they practice and observe their faith or not, are Hebrews by culture (Zerubavel: 1995). The Zionist movement used the power Judaism to unify the nation, and transformed its religious narrative into a secular national narrative, as prayers for God became prayers for the nation, and religious holidays became national holidays that celebrate the emancipation of the Jewish people in the physical homeland of Zion, as opposed to the metaphysical emancipation of the souls of the Jews in heaven (Zerubavel: 1995). Sacredness was transformed from the religious realm to the secular realm.

The land is an integral part to the narrative of most national movement as it complements the notion of continuity and legitimacy of the nation. The land becomes a source of pride as its character could be connected with the character of its population and the source of inspiration for poetry that feeds the national sentiment; the nation could substitute the absent state with the land that unifies them as a people and ties to their ancestors (Morgan: 1983). The themes of "rootedness" and the promise of return placed the land high on the Palestinian narrative as the displaced population romanticize a lost land; The sanctity along with the deep historical ties to the land get emphasized in the collective memory and narrative (Khalidi: 1997).[8] The sacredness and religious connectedness of a people to a land enriches the narrative of legitimacy of

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[7] Social entrepreneurs engage in history rewriting and creating romantic narratives that the targeted audience can identify with, and often they build on preexisting institutions and ideologies such as the message of the church (Wood: 2003, McAdam: 1982, Chong: 1991).

[8] Palestinian refugees are often portrayed with old keys that symbolize their attachment to their lost homes and their right of return.

existence and struggle for the preservation or the recovery of the land.[9] Historical religious sites enter the narrative as legitimations of the right of the people to that land (Khalidi: 1997; Zerubavel: 1995).

The wars of the languages:

Languages and dialects have played, and still play, a very important role in the process of nation creation as they act as unifying characteristics of the people of the one nation, as they build "particular solidarities" according to Anderson (1991: 133). Nationalists of the 18th and 19th century "objectified" language as a tool of exploitation that successfully served as an element of unification first in France with the French Revolution (Geary: 2002: 22), and later in Fichte's (1922) *Addresses to the German Nation*, as he imagined the German nation as "unique" in its linear "continuity in geography and its language" (Geary: 2002: 25; Gottlieb Fichte: 1922). Languages are the means of communication between the members of the nation; in cases when ethnic groups exist within a state and do not identify with its national identity, language becomes their "weapons of the weak" (Scott: 1985) as they resist the use of the dominant or high language (Anderson: 1991) and thrust into their local dialect (Danforth: 1994), revive an old dialect, or even adopt a foreign language as a mean to align themselves with a certain culture outside the realm of the imposed culture. Languages and their uses has been the subject of strategic manipulation by ethnic entrepreneurs in the process of fabrication of a national consciousness (Anderson: 1991), but they also have been utilized by the weak as weapons of resistance against the oppressive means of purification of the state (Danforth: 1995).

The intelligentsia that was creating the new "imagined realities" that would determine the national characteristics of the new nation had, in some cases, to drop their high languages,

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[9] The theme of the sacred land has been used in both the Palestinian and the Israeli narratives as the high religions of both groups claim property of the holy land (Khalidi: 1997; Zerubavel: 1995).

previously sacred languages, and adopt the language of the majority in order to communicate to the masses these determinants (Anderson: 1991: 80, 81). Welsh is one of those language that were revived by the intellectuals that perceived its value for a nation thirsty for cultural autonomy; it was transformed from a "primitive language, to a "pure and undefiled" language by a puritan movement that borrowed religious terminology to sanctify a language (Morgan: 1983: 71). Macedonians paired linguistic separatism with national separatism; a spoken dialect was transformed into a literary language as a political decision aiming to assert cultural independence and legitimacy (Danforth: 1995).

Love one another and hate the other:

Nationalism has the capability to generate the kind of love that one would be willing to die for, and the kind of hate that one would be willing to kill for (Anderson: 1991). Fear is at the root of nation creation. While Anderson (1991) argues that the element of hate in the nationalist narrative is not as significant as it is perceived to be (142), the history of national movements, especially at the time of wars and conflicts, is filled with the demonization of the other (Barreto: 2009; Khalidi: 1997; Zerubavel: 1995; Danforth: 1995). National movements that come into existence at the time of crisis, or that come throughout their history to engage in a conflict, desperately cling to the unifying elements and language of brotherhood and kinship; the need to create an image of "us" becomes necessary as that image would counter the image of the "other" that is threatening "our" existence, "our" autonomy, and "our" noble and natural community (Morgan: 1983; Zerubavel: 1995; Khalidi: 1997). The nation's invented "commemorative narrative" establishes the identity of "us" and draws the divide between "us" and "them"; that divide is strengthened when history is rich enough to provide tools for ethnic entrepreneurs to plant the roots of the nation in a distinct past, a past that was marked with continuous struggle for

survival as one united social entity (Zerubavel: 1995). The kind of narrative that is built on victimization and the continuous existence within a state of conflict, the "other" becomes a requisite to the sustaining of its narrative; that "other" will change over the course of history and will get reinvented along with the group's system of meaning (Zerubavel: 1995; Khalidi: 1997). Nations could unite under a shared "exclusion" as opposed to uniting as a homogeneously cultural group (Gellner: 1983: 79, 80). Wars create nations through the process of "crystallization of national identity" through asserting the definition of "us" vs. the "other" (Danforth: 1995: 18). Nations that get created through the war narrative get maintained through the continuous proclaiming the narrative of "otherness" and it's danger to "our" nation.

The birth of heroes:

Nationalist movements create imagined fathers and mothers that began it all; those that paid the ultimate price for "our" sake. Ethnic entrepreneurs have gone in their imagination to create a hero when one does not exist; rebels, and marginalized groups from the past get promoted to heroic functions (Morgan: 1983; Zerubavel: 1995). The best heroic figures to create are those whose place in the past is as vague as their appearance in the present. Mythology and poetry have played a role in reviving figures that get adopted as "our" own and whose stories tell the tale of a nation rooted deep in the history (Morgan: 1983; Zerubavel: 1995). Martyrdom of leadership is the jackpot for ethnic entrepreneurs, as the ultimate martyr whose life was dedicated to the nation becomes a voice for every patriot to follow on the footsteps of the sanctified leader (Khalidi: 1997). The armed forces serve as the enforcers of uniformity but also as the arena where young men join to manifest their loyalty for the nation/community by willing to die defending "us", "our" territory and "our" values and traditions, where heroes are made.

Discussing the state:

Joel Migdal (1988) in *Strong societies and weak states* was concerned with the challenges that face the state in its attempt to consolidate and centralize its place within its borders in order to face external challenges by other states. He adopted Weber's definition of the state and calls it an "ideal definition" because state making is a much more complex process than a human association, responsible for a territory and has the monopoly over the means of coercion and production; this definition takes the state for granted as It does not explain the complex process of state creation, especially in third world countries where unlike Europe "Nation-States have [not] grown out of powerful state organizations and their increasingly homogeneous societies" (16, 17). Ethnicity as a form of identification predated the creation of the territorial state and its ideological product: nationalism. While both ethnicity and nationalism determine the "us" within group identification, the difference between the two concepts as Eriksen (1993) argued, is that when ethnicities make claim to "political boundaries" they turn into nationalist movements (5, 6). Ethnic movements could give birth to national movements, but they do not constitute a necessary condition. Ethnicities could exist within different national boundaries and identify with differing nation-states, and nation-states could have a diverse ethnic makeup (Danforth: 1995). Ethnic groups exist within nation states, but so long as they don't make irredentist claims, they would not be identified as a national movement.

Migdal (1988) argued that political leaders in post-colonial societies have difficulties establishing strong states because they live in strong societies. They are in a dialectic with strong societal forces over who, what, where and how the state can have power over society. Conflicting groups struggle over who will have social control, "over whether the state will be able to displace or harness other organizations, families, clans, multinational corporations, domestic enterprises, tribes, patron-client dyads, which make the rules against the wishes and

goals of state leaders" (31). States than are not merely in a conflict with society as a single unit: society is a mélange of organizations among which the state is one organization among many. Migdal (1988) studied the struggles that face states in the Third World where the societies are organized in resisting the state, have undermined the advantages and efforts of the states, and sometimes even captured parts of the State (9). State leaders are in a constant struggle to strengthen the state vis-a-vis society by building coherent and effective state organizations that are capable of maintaining the monopoly over the means of coercion and a hegemonic national narrative.

Migdal (1988) defined "social control" as the ability to get "people to behave differently from what they would otherwise do" (4). Social control is the tool through which states can mobilize their population. State capabilities and efforts must be recognized by the civil society as legitimate and as compliant with the ruling ideology. Gramsci would say in this behalf that the strength of the state does not come solely from the monopoly over violence, but in the ability of the ruling class or the hegemonic class to secure the acceptance of the ruled and to get them to do things its way. Compliance and participation of the society are the result of reward and punishment; whereas legitimation indicates people's approval of the state and the acceptance of its myth (Migdal: 1988: 32, 33). In an environment of conflict, compliance, participation and legitimation have been used by state leaders and by competing social organizations. The inability of state leaders to exercise social control has been caused by the structure of the society where resistance of "strongmen" has been effective in undermining the efforts of the state (Migdal: 1988: 33). The rupture between the state and the society and the lack of ideological unity leads the different social groups to unite against the state. A strong state has "hegemony" over its society and establishes a relationship with its society from which it seeks its legitimacy. The state

has a “formative and educative role” that aims at ‘incorporating every individual into the collective man’ (Gramsci: 1929: 242). The state should be viewed as an educator and must not be seen as a “superstructure” left to develop and function separately from the civil society (Gramsci: 1929: 247). The state requests the consent of the civil society, but also educates that consent by means of its public and private political associations (Gramsci: 1929: 259). “The gun and the book” (Gellner: 1983: 82), education and the means of violence, work as centralizing forces of the imagined community. Education serves as the hegemonic tool of social control through inculcating what is “our” history and tradition (Gellner: 1983; Zerubavel: 1995; Danforth: 1995; Gramsci: 1929).[10] When the state fails to exercise social control through educating a national narrative and propagating a collective memory, societal forces from within will compete, with the state and each other, over the legitimate national narrative; multiple memories will be created that will compete for the sentiments of the individuals and their respective communities. National social movements are born within the boundaries of a state as guardians of a counter-narrative and opposing hegemonic ideals.

Gellner (1983) argues in *Nations and Nationalism* that the state is a necessary condition for nationalism (4). While the state has the capability to implement nationalist policies through its institutions, it has not ideally accompanied the creations of national movements. The state can through its education system manipulate the ideological system of its citizens, or compel it through the use of force; yet as history demonstrated, national movements are born in defiance of the state and have been successful at jeopardizing its territorial and ideological legitimacy. Cultures seeking to unify as a nation need the organizational capabilities of the state, the only institution capable of enforcing a homogeneous literary body and professionals; nationalism as a

[10] The success of nationalism gets crowned when it’s adopted by the state educational apparatus and the children and youth of the nation receive a unified national acculturation (Massad: 2001; Zerubavel: 1995).

“political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent” and which generates “national sentiment” (Gellner: 1983: 1) might perceive the control of the political unit, the state, as a goal, but It does not need it to generate that sentiment. Not all imagined nations succeed in achieving the ultimate goal of legitimately monopolizing the use of force and “legitimate education”, as Gellner called it; and not relinquish their resistance to the status quo and succumb to the ideological authority of the state. Nationalism is necessary for the creation of an ideologically homogeneous nation-state, but it is not necessary for the creation of national movements and sentiments. The modern state has been created under the pretense of homogeneity and the need for self-determination, and has when possible silenced internal groups calling for territorial and administrative independence (Danforth: 1995). Some states have succeeded in nationalizing these groups; others have either failed in their effort, or failed to even make the effort.

National Social Movements:

In this next section, I will discuss national social movements that operate within the boundaries of a territorial state that fails at fulfilling its hegemonic educative role. Nationalism appears as a social movement before it gets adopted by the state and undergoes the process of national internalization. I will attempt to study national movements through the literature of social movements and to categories them as resistance movements that compete with the state and at times attempt to capture it. National movements that succeed at exercising social control over the target society achieve their goal of capturing the state and monopolizing its institutional tools; those that fail at creating a collective narrative that could get internalized by the majority fail and remain in a constant state of resistance. Social movements are associations of disgruntled people that come together as “self-designated claimants”, with an “object of claim” targeting an

authority of some sort and a “public” whose compliance and support is imperative (Tilly and Wood: 2013: 4). Social movements are a historically new kind of contentious politics as they were an invention that accompanied the creation of the state, and the nation state. Monopoly over the use of violence and legitimacy are the tools of control of the state. In the 20th and 21st century, armed militias that jeopardize the state’s monopoly over violence have challenged the state’s power, and groups that created a counter-narrative challenged the legitimacy of the state. Social movements are generally peaceful movements that do not have the capabilities to challenge the state through violence and rather target its legitimacy. Still, there are social movements that have been successful in challenging both the state’s monopoly over violence and legitimacy through a sustained armed collective action (Wood: 2003). These armed social movements have been particularly successful in overthrowing the status quo, something peaceful social movements are incapable of achieving. Social movements that have been successful at sustaining their existence, with or without successes or fulfilled agendas, were the ones that, like nationalist movements, have created a hegemonic ideology that substitutes the ideals and narratives of the state and other competitor narratives (Ramos-Zayas: 2003; Armstrong: 2002; Wood: 2003; Scott: 1985). The process of myth making and romanticizing shared ideals, such as the motherland (Ramos-Zayas: 2003), religious symbols of resistance (Wood: 2003; Okrent: 2010), among others, has been essential to the persistence of national social movements.

Social movement’s peculiarities:

What differentiate social movements from other kinds of contentious politics is the combination of three elements: a sustained public *campaign*, a combination of behavior display called *repertoire*, and their public display of *worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment* (Tilly and Wood: 2013). Social movements’ history, agenda, ideology, structural settings, and political

opportunities play a big role in how and when they operate these three elements. Sustained campaigns have taken different forms under the different circumstances (Tilly and Wood: 2013: 4). Their repertoire would be consistent with their campaign methods (Tilly and Wood: 2013); it could consist of marches and limited displays of violence (Okrent: 2010), parades when the setting is safe and friendly (Armstrong: 2002), myth making and the romanticization of a past event or status (Ramos-Zayas: 2003; Armstrong: 2002; Scott: 1985; Barreto: 2009), and public displays of allegiances and loyalties (Ramos-Zayas: 2003).

Worthiness has been displayed through the sponsoring or leadership of religious figures and religious or nationalistic slogans (Okrent: 2010; McAdam: 1982; Wood: 2003), publicly known figures (Okrent: 2010; McAdam: 1982; Armstrong: 2002), claims of superior status (Scott: 1985; Okrent: 2010, Ramos-Zayas: 2003). Unity was expressed through the common use of a language (Ramos-Zayas: 2003), of a narrative of resistance (Ramos-Zayas: 2003; Okrent: 2010; Armstrong: 2002), clothing (Ramos-Zayas: 2003) and organized marches and protests (McAdam: 1982; Okrent: 2010). Numbers have been very important to the power display of unity and worthiness of social movements especially in public on the streets (McAdam: 1982; Armstrong: 2002; Okrent: 2010). And finally commitment is the sustaining of the campaign under tough conditions (Tilly and Wood: 2013, Okrent: 2010), sacrificing a social status for the sake of the movement (Ramos-Zayas: 2003; Armstrong: 2002), and the ultimate sacrifice: life (Wood: 2003, McAdam: 1982).

The importance of organization and leadership:

Organization is critical to social movements throughout all the stages of their existence. Robert Michels (1962) argued in his book *Political parties* that organization is “the only means for the creation of a collective will” (61); he even called organization “the weapon of the weak in

their struggle with the strong" (61). The most studied and emulated social movement, the civil rights movement, could not have been as successful as it has had it not been for the strong organizations that grew out of smaller organizations: the churches and the black colleges (Chong: 1991; McAdam: 1982). The coordination and unified decision making and actions were essential to the success of the civil rights movement (Chong: 1991; McAdam: 1982).

Social movements need resources in order to sustain their campaign (McAdam: 1982). It needs the people of all ranks, the space, and the finances. The generation of financial resources is essential in defining the capabilities of social movements and their repertoire (Okrent: 2010). Leaders are indispensable because they are needed; no collective action could sustain itself without the authority that will unite it and direct its actions: "the incompetence of the masses is almost universal throughout the domains of political life, and this constitutes the most solid foundation of the power of the leaders" (Michels: 1962: 111). Unity among the leadership is indispensable to the unity of the social movement (McAdam: 1982).

Reaffirming the role of the intelligentsia in narrative creation:

The social entrepreneurs play a very important role in the formation of social movements as they act as creators of the narrative that will establish the identity of the movements and its participants (Barreto: 2009, Wood: 2003). They establish the parameters of "us" and what it means to be "us" through narratives and symbols that speak to the emotive need of peripheralized individuals (Barreto: 2009, Wood: 2003). The intelligentsia establishes the language of the movement and the tools of mobilization of individuals (Barreto: 2009, Wood: 2003, Schuessler: 2000). These "producers of participation"…"strategically target the expressive motivation of prospective participants in order to elicit their participation" (Schuessler: 2000: 63).

One of the best examples of the role of social entrepreneurs in large mobilization is the insurgent collective action discussed by Wood (2003) and provides the best example of a national social movement; the method with which people's identity was utilized through the liberation theology highly correlates with Schuessler's arguments for the expressive needs of participants and the producer's ability to utilize these expressive motivations. The clergy of El Salvador created a narrative of suffering based on the catholic teachings of the suffering of Jesus for human kind; they glorified suffering and transformed participation at the potential cost for lives into a pleasure, a joy to be part of the salvation of El Salvador (Wood: 2003). The leaders of the Gay movement created a gay identity and romanticized it with the stonewall riots that became the event where fellow gay men and women paid the highest price for "us" to be saved from that cycle of violence (Armstrong: 2002). Social entrepreneurs, like ethnic national entrepreneurs, engage in history rewriting and creating romantic narratives that the targeted audience can identify with, and often they build on preexisting institutions and ideologies of religious institutions in societies where these still constitute the primary space of identification of society (Wood: 2003, McAdam: 1982, Chong: 1991).

Participation and identity affirmation as choice:

The human agent and the diversity of people's perceptions of rationality are very important to the study of social movements and national movements alike. The individual participating in a social movement is choosing to participate or not to participate depending on his evaluation of the costs and benefits of participation (Barreto: 2009, Wood: 2003, Schuessler: 2000). While some need social incentives and the fear of punishment to maintain their membership in a social movement (Barreto: 2009, Chong: 1991), others participate for the sake of psychological benefits (Chong: 1991; Schuessler: 2000), assuming the absence of material benefits in this analysis.

Belonging to something bigger then one's self, being part of a larger family, playing a political role that is perceived to be important, and "taking part in a historic event" or a "noble cause", all are incentives that drive individuals to take action and participate in a social movement (Chong: 1991: 9, 10).

Schuessler (2000) argues that emotive benefits are public as well as private, as individuals internalize those feelings of belonging, of "being", and do not need a public to affirm or evaluate these feeling. The participant in a national social movement could be parallel here to a religious individual's activities and emotions. Certain social movement could become as significant and expressive as religions for certain individuals. These individuals will be willing to pay the highest price for the preservation and success of the movement (Barreto: 2009; Chong: 1991; Schuessler: 2000).

The leaders and activists that paid the highest price received a different kind of benefit or good (Barreto: 2009), a social good through which they were praised, glorified and eternalized in the memories and history books (Barreto: 2009, Wood: 2003). This kind of social and psychological benefit comes from the recognition by others of the costs that were paid by those few that dedicated themselves to the cause (Chong: 1991, Barreto: 2009); it obeys the small group dynamic where individuals monitor and pressure each other, and also praise and punish each other (Barreto: 2009, Chong: 1991). People participate because social benefits are very valuable to them and they are willing to pay the price for those social awards and benefits that will place them at the top of the hierarchy amongst their peers (Barreto: 2009). They become the authors of their own destiny and claim a social standing that they otherwise would not have enjoyed had they not participated in the very costly collective action (Wood: 2003). Resistance and commitment become the foundations on which heroic narratives are created and social and

emotive motives for participation are generated (Ramos-Zayas: 2003, Wood: 2003, Barreto: 2009, Okrent: 2010, McAdam: 1982). Within successful movements, ideology and social control becomes the realm of the newly created elite: the leaders of the movement that develop the tools of control that could best be utilized for mobilization and confirmation of the members' loyalty (Scott: 1985; Wood: 2003; Barreto: 2009).

Not all *Campesinos* participated in the Collective insurgency of El Salvador but of those who did, there were those who were rebelling against their previous status as poor helpless slaves, and recreating a resistance identity based on defeating the injustice and the excessive force of the authority (Wood: 2003). These are the emotive needs that cannot be shared or divided; they get internalized by the individual and manifest themselves through collective action. Again we cannot disregard the material benefit of land possessions, but land is a public good that was distributed to all regardless of whether they participated or not (Wood: 2003). It is not the land possession that led people to participate even though they saw death all around them; they weighed the costs and benefits of participation and found that dying for the cost of defying the unjust powers was worth it as they were fulfilling their moral commitments towards the Godly message for social justice and reclaiming their dignity (Wood: 2003). Persecution and violence against the participants could fortify the individual's sense of identity and lead them to participate out of "defiance" (Wood: 2003: 233) or reevaluate their costs and benefits and perhaps retreat from the movement (Wood: 2003, Armstrong: 2002).

When the structural setting is not free and open and when the cost of expressing grief is very high, people create forms of resistance that will jeopardize the legitimacy of the authority while avoiding direct and costly confrontation (Scott: 1985). These "everyday forms of resistance" are "the weapons of the weak" (Scott: 1985). Organization and action are burdensome in oppressive

settings when the hand of the authority is fierce and the eye of the authority is wide open. Social movements have worked around these constraints through dressing resistance with cloak of the sheep within non-suspicious settings (Wood: 2003) or through waging a "cold war of symbols" (Scott: 1985: 22).

Sentiment generation and the rationality of participation:

The definition of rationality has been ever evolving as social scientists tested its meanings and redefined it based on their falsifiable observations. Rationality no longer pertains to the maximizing of the material and has been modified to the maximizing of social and psychological rewards and benefits (Barreto: 2009; Chong: 1991; Schuessler: 2000; Wood: 2003). Individuals that put themselves in a situation that is perceived to be costly can be seen as acting on a rational basis of cost and benefit calculations. The majority, will free ride, but still many will participate under the understanding that the cost will be very high (Wood: 2003). Rationality does not equal the absence of emotion, as both processes developed simultaneously and complement each other (Damasio: 1994).

As Damasio (1994) has argued in his *Descartes' error* through his medical experiments, the absence of emotion from the human cognition does not lead to better decision making in the personal and social domains. "Deciding on whom you will love or forgive, making career choices, or choosing an investment are in the immediate personal and social domain" (Damasio: 1994: 168). Damasio is making the point that even feelings that we perceive as emotional are subject to a rational process. Hence participating in a march, wearing a pin as a political statement, displaying affiliation through the exercise of certain rituals, and providing support to an insurgent are all rational decisions that fulfill an emotive human need (Schuessler: 2000).

Religion in the narrative of national social movements:

Religion is the oldest and most valuable tool of control in the realm of politics and social movements have successfully used it for the generation of collective action. Social entrepreneurs have utilized some group's strong identification with religion to target the expressive needs of individuals (Wood: 2003; Schuessler: 2000). Religious texts and meanings have the potential to be utilized in the creation of a resistance language and eventually action (Wood: 2003). Wood (2003) discusses in her book *Insurgent collective action and civil war in El Salvador*, the role that "liberation theology" played in mobilizing Salvadoran Campesinos. Participation at the highest cost becomes a duty towards fellow men and God (Wood: 2003: 232, 233).

Persecution or the perception of persecution, and marginalization of groups has the potential to intimidate participants and lead them to form underground cells away from the public eye (Armstrong: 2002; Okrent: 2010), or could lead to action out of defiance (Ramos-Zayas: 2003; Wood: 2003). Seeing others suffer at the hand of authorities, especially when one closely associates with those others, will have the effect of mobilizing action to guarantee that "family members and fellow activists were not to have died in vain, those remaining must not forsake the struggle for justice, but continue it" (Wood: 2003: 233, 234). A "liberation theology" provides the incentive to die for a good cause and perhaps kill for a good cause (Wood: 2003). This is when social movements turn into real threats to authority, as they have not only undermined its social control, but also it's monopoly over the legitimate use of violence.

Concluding thoughts:

The review of the nationalism literature reveals the importance of the state for the success of national movements. While social movements with a national ideology might succeed at creating a sustainable ideological resistance narrative over a long period of time, it is only through the state educative apparatuses that they can succeed at educating multi-ethno-religious to relinquish

their primordial loyalties and swear allegiance to the nation state. That being said, control over state institutions is futile in the absence of a national consensus among the differing groups to participate in the nation-state building process. A state whose sole purpose is to act as the mediator between ideologically opposing groups is incapable of generating national harmony. The national movement that fails at promulgating its narrative through the state will eventually radicalize its agenda out of frustration and mutate into a militant organization that acts as a state within the state.

Methodology:

Rational choice in its look at collective narrative creation requires looking at the micro, the individuals and how they come to identify with the community/nation, and the macro, those who contribute to the identity creation process. In this study I will concentrate on the social entrepreneurs and the very important role they play in the formation of national movements as they act as creators of the narrative that will establish the identity of the movements and its participants as they establish the parameters of "us" and what it means to be "us" through narratives and symbols that speak to the emotive need of individuals. The intelligentsia establishes the language of the movement and the tools of mobilization for collective thought generation and action. I will base my study on the writings and speeches of the social entrepreneurs, from the literary intellectuals that revived Phoenicia, to the church leaders that associated liberty and freedom of religion with the territorial entity that is Lebanon, to the militia leaders that glorified death in the name of God and the land, romanticized resistance and self-sacrifice.

Chapter Two: The Lebanese Christian movement:

From Phoenicianism to the re-awakening of the Maronite gun:

Romanticists have perceived Lebanese Christian nationalism as an ethnic movement that began its resistance journey in the 7th century and have seen the revival of the Christian gun in the 20th century as an extension of this movement that has struggled throughout its existence, to create and maintain a national home (Phares: 1995). In this thesis, I will argue that the Lebanese Christian national movement is a social movement that was created with the birth of the territorial state, and that has capitalized on the historical origins of that particular land, to legitimize their claims towards the state and the rest of society. I will use the terms "Lebanese national movement" and "Christian national movement" simultaneously and will reference to the Maronites as the political unit that lead this movement. I will discuss the two stages of the movement, the first being the period between the creation of Greater Lebanon in 1920 up until the end of the 1960s when Lebanon began to be directly affected by the Arab-Israeli conflict, hence the second stage being the period before the civil war up until the early 1990s. The two stages will reflect the nature of social movements as they evolve according to the structural settings under which they operate, and the political opportunities that determine the successes and failures of the movement. The discussion of the Lebanese Christian national movement requires, as has been shown in the theoretical section of this thesis, a look at the literature of nationalism and social movements, as national movements begin as social movements and work on grabbing the state; their goal would be to control the state and achieve territorial and ideological independence. In the case study at hand, the national social movement failed to control the state, as the state's legitimacy lies in its "non-assimilationist and non-interventionist

policy" (Al-Khazen: 2000: 95), meaning that the state was created only as the protector of the rights of the community to practice self-governance and civil and political autonomy. This structure has meant that the state could not be dominated by one national ethos, as it would be misusing its *raison d'état*.

Lebanon's Christians, its Maronites in particular, saw Lebanon as their historical home, their creation, hence their legitimate claims to a dominant role within its government and the superiority and authenticity of their version of Lebanism. In the Lebanese Christian narrative, Lebanon is the heaven of the Christians in an overwhelmingly Muslim area; It is where their faith can be manifested in its fullest through the exercise of religious freedom that is crowned by a political system that guarantees freedom for the sect and maintains the status of Christians as equal, or even superior, to their co-citizens, the Muslims and the Druze. Lebanism has been, since the inception of the idea of Lebanon as an independent unit, a mélange of ideas from Phoenicianism, Mediterranism, political Maronitism, Christian militancy, an attachment to Mount Lebanon and the concept of liberty and self-rule. The movement's ethnic entrepreneurs have across the decades emphasized one idea over the other, so as to engage in the national dialectic and the internal one within the Maronite community at the two major stages of its existence. Phoenicianism and Mediterranism were awakened at a time when competing ideologies were threatening the creation of a Lebanon independent from the Arab world, whereas Christian militancy was awakened at the time of conflict when the Lebanese street, in particular the human reserve of the Mountain was needed to fight *the enemies of the Christian nation* and preserve the sovereignty of Lebanese territory. The concepts of liberty and the mythological role of Mount Lebanon remained at the essence of the movement and the legitimating peculiarities of its message. The strength of the Lebanese Christian movement has been through creating a bond

between the people and the land and the role of the Church that articulated what we can call a "liberation theology" and the association of death for the land with sainthood, and the marriage of Lebanon, the country, to Maronitism, the creed.

The Lebanese Christian national movement's worthiness was displayed through their claim that their movement was a manifestation of their Christian faith and the Maronite creed of freedom and self-determination, and their historical roots in Mount Lebanon. Their repertoire was based on a process of myth making and the romanticizing of the motherland (Ramos-Zayas: 2003; Armstrong: 2002; Scott: 1985; Barreto: 2009; Zerubavel: 1995), through reviving the Phoenician past in the first stage and the violent past of the community in the second stage. The movement was based on a resistance narrative against the traitors that have failed to relinquish their religious and ethnic loyalties for the sake of Lebanon, the religious being Islam and the ethnic being Arab.

The failure of social movements to assimilate within the larger social order, and in the case of Lebanon to get the authority to adopt their brand of nationalism, leads to a collective frustration and radicalization of the campaign and repertoire of the movement (Ramos-Zayas: 2010). That radicalization within the Lebanese Christian community was manifested through the militarization of the movement and the creation of militias that aim at freeing Lebanon from the "other". Their repertoire changed with the structural changes and included the romanticization of death and suffering as the price for freedom and of turning the deceased fighters into Saints that sacrificed their lives for "us" to live (Zerubavel: 1995; Barreto: 2009). In this chapter, I will discuss the Christian national movement and the evolution of its campaign, repertoire and public display across the two major stages in its existence through a look at the role of the Maronites in the creation of the Lebanon, the role of the church and its message in the movement, the effect of

the confessional political system on the movement, Maronite collective memory and myth making, and the role of ethnic entrepreneurs in utilizing cultural tools to invent traditions, revive the past and generate collective action, and the creation of a language and symbols of resistance during the time of conflict and post-conflict as the movement turns to the weapons of the weak: pacifist resistance.

Creating Modern Lebanon:

The Levantine state is the result of colonialism and of the European efforts to create the artificial "territorial state" (Ayubi: 2008: 86). Nazih Ayubi (2008) argued in *Overstating the Arab State* that the Levantine state's weakness stems from its formation, or institution, 'from without' as opposed to being created 'from within' through an 'organic' sociological and political process (108). Ayubi discusses (2008) the Napoleonic European state model that emerges as an autonomous entity and comes into being as a rational decision and represents the whole society and completes that society; whereas the Austrian model that characterizes the Lebanese state is a tool in the hands of a certain class that arbitrates between the different groups in order to maintain its superiority and to protect its interest through the state apparatuses.

The Lebanese modern state is an artificial entity that failed to create a nation and to maintain itself through the monopolization of the instruments of coercion (Ayubi: 2008: 109), and the promulgation of a unified national narrative. The birth of Lebanon as an independent unit was not accompanied by the birth of a Lebanese nation. "Greater Lebanon" created by the French in 1920 is the result of the partition plan that the colonialist powers executed in the Levant area of the Middle East (Hiro: 1992).[11] Post-independence it became known as Lebanon and was marked

[11] In 1920, the French mandate drew the present boundaries of Lebanon out of three areas: Mount Lebanon, Bekaa, and the coast (Tripoli and Beirut) (Ayubi: 2008: 114).

in 1943 by the National Pact, an agreement between elite members of the Maronite and the Sunni community, each of which put aside their ideological differences, agreeing to make political concessions for the sake of liberating this new state from the French (Hiro: 1992; Picard: 1996). The Maronites promised to relinquish their ties with Europe and accept the "Arab face" of Lebanon, and the Sunnis promised to seize their demands for reuniting with Syria and to accept Lebanon as an independent sovereign state (Hiro: 1992; Picard: 1996). The National Pact divided power in Lebanon proportionally along confessional lines among the different religious communities and institutionalized sectarianism in Lebanon under a political system known as "confessionalism".

The European powers started interfering in the Near East in the 19th century and saw in the fellow Christian Elite in Mount Lebanon a great partner through whom they would begin to encroach on the Ottoman Empire and expand their influence to shape the area. World War One ended the autonomous status of Mount Lebanon; the local elite sought foreign help, by which the Lebanese were seeking an independence from the Ottoman Empire only to invite the French to sponsor their soon to be independent state (Picard: 2002: 27, 28).[12] The relationship between the Maronites and French was not novel at the time as it extended back to the Maronite church's unification with the Catholic Church since the 13th century. French leaders angered Muslims as they publicly stated that "the French came to save their Maronite friends", and that "Lebanon is to be created to serve the Maronites" (Dib: 2013: 91). The French and English mandate of the Arab East was a reminder of the Crusaders, especially for Lebanon's Sunnis that became a minority in a Maronite Lebanon created by the colonial powers in the overwhelmingly Arab

[12] In 1918, Sykes-Picot agreement divided the Near East between France and England; it put Lebanon under the French rule until 1943 (Picard: 2002: 29). The French entered Lebanon in 1918 out of economic interest in the East; French companies had large investments in the Ottoman Empire and needed to maintain its control of the area in order to protect its interests (Picard: 2002: 29).

Sunni region (Dib: 2013). An independent Lebanon dominated by the Maronites could not have happened without the French; Maronite intellectuals like Charles Corm even rejected the Lebanese calls for France to grant Lebanon independence in the beginning of the 1940s, as he could not imagine that Lebanon could remain Christian without the French (Kaufman: 2004: 158).[13] The Maronite lobby called for the annexation of the coast to Mount Lebanon, which changed the demography of the newly formed Greater Lebanon. Maronites and Druze, two minorities that have coexisted for centuries, inhabited the Mount, are joined now by the Sunnis, Orthodox Christians and Shias that inhabited the regions that were not part of the historical Mount Lebanon.

The Sunni population that enjoyed the special treatment under the fellow Sunni Ottoman Empire, did not feel at ease under the new government that disconnected them from what they considered to be their Arab Brethren; they felt more connected with the Arab nationalist movement and called for the joining of Lebanon with "Greater Syria" and rejected Lebanese nationalism (Picard: 2002). The Greek Orthodox shared an affinity to the Arab nationalism with the Sunnis, feared Maronite hegemony and their relationship with the West. The Shia, themselves were a minority at the beginning of the 20th century, that fled Sunni persecution, adapted with the new government (Picard: 2002: 32) that they hoped would not subject them to the tyranny of the majority. The Druze, that coexisted with the Maronites in Mount Lebanon for centuries, were weary from the 1860 war with the latter and were indignant at the Maronites and

[13] The Maronites were disappointed at the beginning of the civil war as their historical ally, France, failed to respond to their calls for help (Khalifah: 1997); when they joined the Muslim regions to their territory anticipated the continuation of their political dominance with the assistance of France. As the international political structure shifted after the Second World War, the Maronites lost their foreign backing and the guarantor of their superiority.

the hegemonic role they were playing (Yehya: 2013).

A homeland for the Christians:

As it is widely promulgated by the Maronite intelligentsia, there is no Lebanon without the Maronites, and no Maronites without Lebanon. While the Maronites since the 19th century have been portrayed and studied as a political unit, they historically were divided between feudal lords and peasants, and ideologically between the Maronite church and the Intellectuals of Beirut (Kaufman: 2004: 9); the prospect of creation of a national home for a Christian minority in the Arab East led the different parties to join efforts in the creation process of the new territorial entity and begin a movement aiming at baptizing the rest of society with the Maronite principles on Lebanon's identity. Lebanism as an ideology has not had a linear development according to Carol Hakim-Dowek (1997) in *The origins of the Lebanese National Idea, 1840-1914* (Kaufman: 2004: 5, 6). Hakim-Dowek argues that Lebanism, the idea of an independent political entity, appeared with the Maronite clergy of Mount Lebanon around 1840 and diminished with the creation of *Al-Qai'maqamiyya* and *Al-Mutasarrifiya* systems respectively in 1842 and 1861 (Kaufman: 2004: 5, 6). Like Arabism that was not compellingly expanded until the fall of the Ottoman Empire in the Arab east and the Arabian Peninsula (Dawn: 1973), Lebanism was initially expressed within the Ottoman administrative and political context (Kaufman: 2004). Hakim-Dowek shows in her study the "non-linear development" of lebanism amongst Lebanon's Christians until the beginning of the French mandate when Mount Lebanon's expansion and independence became a unifying agenda amongst the political forces (Kaufman: 2004: 6). The Maronite church, that had hitherto been the engineer of Maronite creed in Mount Lebanon, did not begin to promote Phoenicianism until 1919, as Maronite intellectuals introduced Phoenicianism as the basis for their Lebanist theory; they came together in their lobbying with

the French for an independent Lebanon arguing for their western origins and their cultural and political separation from the rest of the Arab world (Kaufman: 2004: 12).

While the Maronite leadership and intelligentsia were united in their calling and agreement on the creation of a homeland for the Christians of Mount Lebanon, that would be completely independent from the Arab world, they disagreed on the form of their political unit, in particular on its territorial boundaries and hence its ethnic and religious composition. The dialectic around the limits of territorial Lebanon reflected the multi-polarity of the movement and the variation in the perception of the project that would shape Christian presence and hegemony of Lebanon in the decades to come. The division was along the lines of those in favor of enlarging the territory of Mount Lebanon and annexing the Mediterranean cities of historical Phoenicia, along with the Bekaa valley and South Lebanon, that were predominantly Sunni, Shia, and Christian orthodox, and those in favor of maintaining the borders of Mount Lebanon as is with it's overwhelming Maronite population (Phares: 1995; Traboulsi: 2013). The dominant argument for the annexation of these regions was economic as the Maronites of the mountains had suffered from starvation during the First World War One as their mountain, that served as their protector, was the source of their weakness when the Ottoman empire ended the autonomous status of the Mountain and subjected its population to repression and famine (Phares: 1995). Annexing the coast and the agriculturally rich Bekaa valley would guarantee the new political entity economic independence and openness to the Mediterranean.[14] The opposing camp pleaded for the establishment of a *Petit Liban* that would maintain the border of Mount Lebanon's *Mutasarrifiya*; they argued for the maintenance of the Mount as the homeland for Christians and "the establishment of a

[14] It was later revealed that the Maronite church and feudal lords possessed agricultural land within the annexed region, hence their fierce lobbying for Greater Lebanon (Phares: 1995: 72).

homogeneous Christian state" (Phares: 1995: 71; Traboulsi: 2013). They warned of the reduction of the Christians in Greater Lebanon to a minority status, as they would share their homeland with the Muslims, and the change in the identity of the new entity, as Lebanon will no longer be the "asylum of Christians" in the Middle East (Phares: 1995: 71, 72; Traboulsi: 2013). As one partisan of *Petit Liban* stated: "Where is this Christian homeland, whereas a homeland is a place where family gathers? What is a family where half of its members are strangers" (Phares: 1995: 72). The "imagined" nation as one large "family" could not be utilized in this new entity as it was composed of multiples "families" with differing historical legitimacies, differing collective memories, cultural symbols and images, and most importantly with historical episodes of aggression towards each other and memories of persecution.

Lebanon's historicity is the source of quarrel amongst Lebanese historians and ideologues as one party has been aiming at constructing a historical legitimacy for this small entity, whereas the other is attempting to demonstrate the modernity and artificiality of Lebanon. Positioning Lebanon as an entity that ages over 5000 years gives it the historical legitimacy necessary for the production of emotional legitimacy on the populist level. *Reviving Phoenicia* as Asher Kaufman (2004) titled his book on Lebanon's identity, gives the multi-religious and multi-cultural Lebanon a sense of commonality and continuity with a glorious past. Regardless of the authenticity of Lebanon's rooting back to the Phoenicia, the history of that land that was once occupied by the so-called Phoenicians or Canaanites has underwent a process of narrativization by Lebanon's creators and their ethnic entrepreneurs. As Kaufman (2004) expressed in his study of Phoenician revival within the Lebanese identity: "I still consider the validity of Phoenicianism, or lack thereof, irrelevant to this study. The main thrust here is to analyze how a community imagined itself and not whether this imagining was historically conceivable" (11). It

is the creation of a narrative within the collective memory of a people that is the subject of this study and not the accuracy and historicity of their claims.

Since its inception, Lebanese nationalists have invested in the justification of the creation of Lebanon and have searched for unifying narratives that would warrant the loyalty of all factions of a divided society (Kaufman: 2004). The National Pact, the function of which was to unify Lebanon's religious groups, was more of a "communitarian pact" as it was formed as a barrier between the individual loyalties to the state (Picard: 2002: 71); it did not reflect popular consensus and allowed the creation of a communitarian society that has the power to overrun and occupy the state (Picard: 2002).[15] The communitarian society had multiple imagined narratives that competed for the capturing of the state and hence grabbing the tool through which *their* narrative would be inculcated. While in this thesis I will concentrate on the Christian Maronite national movement and its narrative, I will occasionally reference the competing narratives and their impact on the case study. In this next section I will discuss the confessional system and the weakness of the Lebanese state within the strong communitarian society.

Confessionalism and the weakness of the Lebanese state:

Confessionalism is enshrined in the Lebanese state structure and in the people's minds. The communal identity, on which the Lebanese state was built, not only persists till this day, it coexists with an imaged and non-existent Lebanese identity. Today, every Lebanese community, headed by a patron, or a *Za'îm*, has its own conception of the "truth".[16] They are respected by the members of their communities and have the power to precipitate their agendas, ideologies, and to

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[15] The National Pact was a elitist back door deal that was presented to the public as a *fait accompli* (Picard: 2002).

[16] A term of aggrandizing used in the Lebanon in reference to the political leaders.
"The term *Za'îm* (plural: *Zu'amâ*) comes from the Turkish word *ziamet*, which denoted a military commander superior to the other officers in the military corps" (Khalifah: 1997: 71).

generate collective action (Khalifah: 1997). Divisions in Lebanon are not merely confessions, as within each confession, feudal style patrons, have played a defacto leadership role within their own regions and communities (Hovsepian: 2008).[17] This system prevented the state from exercising its hegemonic role as a unifying agency in every aspect of society; it promoted and encouraged separatism and prevented the emergence of a Lebanese "citizen"; religious and communal groups were even segregated geographically (Hovsepian: 2008). The member of society had a direct relationship with their community and rarely with the state. The language of the state is yet to overturn the sectarian and communal language.

The weakness of the Lebanese state was the direct result of the establishment of the confessional political system, and that while foreign actors had a role in undermining the state, it was the Lebanese political system that institutionalized a weak state and allowed the society to overpower it. The confessional system, through which the sects defined their political representation at the state level, failed to relinquish authority from the fractioned communities and unify it in a centralized state authority.[18] It gave the communities the autonomy that the state failed to claim in regards to its society and to neighboring states and non-state actors. Communal ideology reigned in the absence of a state ideology and the fifteen-year civil war increased the animosity among the entrenched Lebanese and politicized every aspect of their lives.

In *Bringing The State Back in*, Skocpol (1985) argues that the state is in a relationship with the society, yet also has certain autonomy to make policies and takes decisions that do not reflect

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[17] From the war emerged a new set of elite that were empowered by militias and were not part of the historical leadership strata (Makdisi: 1996), such as Samir Geagea, the militiaman that led the Lebanese Forces after the assassination of Bashir Gemayel. Wealth also became a determinant of leadership post the civil war (Khalifah: 1997), as billionaires like Rafic Hariri became the new leader of the Sunni community.

[18] Each sect has (till this day) an official leadership that would manage its member's daily lives from marriage laws (no civil marriage till this day), to inheritance and personal matters, its own schools and curriculums, even hospitals and social organizations (Hovsepian: 2008).

the demands of the different social groups (9). In Lebanon, the state could not claim this function. The state was a tool and reflected class realities; it was created "merely as an arbiter among conflicting groups" (Ayubi: 2008: 109), and the role of the rulers was to balance the communities and to keep them from annihilating each other and entering in armed conflicts. At the time of crisis, the state failed to even fulfill the role of the mediator and the fragmented society out powered it. This was manifested with the eruption of the civil war between 1975 and 1989 and was also confirmed by Taif Accord that brought an end to the war, legitimized Syrian armed and political presence, and the right of arms for Hezbollah, the last of the militias from the Lebanese civil war.

The Confessional system was presumably made in order to accommodate to Lebanon's sectarian mosaic and guarantee all political groups a piece of the pie. Yet while it celebrated and affirmed communal autonomy and power, it was detrimental to the state that was tested and failed at the time of conflict. Confessionalism institutionalized the culture of clientelism, the antithesis of professionalism, which is central to any state and the detriment factor to its autonomy; it politicized religion and denied the state the ability to create a unified secular Lebanese identity and forced the Lebanese to identify by their sect or have no identity. The state as a tool of domination in the hands of the Lebanese patrons and the confessional system legitimized the authority of the different communal patrons to exercise social control and to run their areas like mini states and allowed every community to have its own "hegemonic" ideas;[19] "an ethos of national unity" was never developed and sectarianism proved to constitute the

[19] At the time of crisis when the state failed to mitigate between the different Lebanese societal groups, they each called on foreign powers to intervene and tilt the power in their favor.

"antithesis of a nation" (Makdisi: 1996: 24).[20] Communities enjoyed a high level of autonomy from the state and the sectarian elites held the real political power in the state and acted as a link between the state and the society.

The Maronite leadership that was offered a multi-national territory from which it would create a nation, failed miserably as it remained attached to its traditional roles as community leaders and failed to create the national consensus needed to marry the rest of the country to their Lebanist ideology (Dib: 2013: 92). Lebanon's *Zu'ama* failed to govern a nation, and concentrated all their national efforts on getting the elite of every sect to join their club (Dib: 2013: 100), and the neo-Phoenicians, that will be discussed in the next section, failed to perceive any ideas outside the limited scope of reviving a myth. While Phoenicia was reviving in theory, that revival was not getting manifested as the major Phoenician cities were suffering from government neglect, and did not see the development that Beirut enjoyed, and while 4% of the Lebanese population were in control of 50% of the economy, the majority of the rest lived in poverty in the decade leading to the civil war (Dib: 2013: 101, 102).[21] This fact reflects the superficiality of the Phoenician rhetoric as it remained an elite tool, for the elite, and it was never manifested into a national project of social and political reform that would benefit the disenfranchised and resurrect their belief in the ability of Lebanon, as created by the Maronites, to deliver the promise of development and peace within the turbulent Arab east.

The Children of Phoenicia:

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[20] Makdisi (1996) argued that the civil war was the exhibition of popular discontent with the communitarian elitist pact that permitted the elite to dominate the state's structure and ideology. He placed the struggle between an elitist state and a divided society that came together as a result of a compromise and argued that the civil war was an utilization of sectarianism to revolt against the confessional system based on compromise between communal elites; the militias that took up arms during the civil war were revolting against other sects and against their own elite.

[21] The cities were advertised as Phoenician by the state for touristic purposes.

Lebanon's neo-Phoenicians looked for legitimacy for their newly established entity in the very past of the Phoenicians the historical inhabitants of a region that includes today's Lebanon, but that also contracted and expanded throughout the Mediterranean across the centuries. Phoenicia's history has been simplified to fit a narrative that first, places the Lebanese and their ancestors among the originators of western civilization, as neo-Phoenicians embraced the argument that Hellenic civilization was of Phoenician origins which would make the Phoenicians the pioneers of western civilization; second, paints the ancestors of Lebanon as one political unit, one people that underwent conquests, and remained united, through a historical period that expands over 5000 years, when historically Phoenician era existed from12th century BC till the 3rd century BC (Kaufman: 2004: 5).[22]

Lebanon's Christian intelligentsia had a mission of precipitating a narrative that would be acceptable by the Maronites as assertive of their dominance in Lebanon, but that would also reject Arab and Syrian nationalism, two national narrative that challenged the legitimacy of Lebanon as a nation and competed with the Lebanese nationalists for the hearts and minds of this new and diverse population. None of the nationalist currents had control over the state nor had access to a national education system that would educate a unifying national narrative. The ideas were flowing in a free market and it was up to the group with the strongest claim to win. The result was that none of the these ideas achieved a hegemonic success, as Phoenicianism remained in the domain of the Maronite Christians, Syrian nationalism was dominated mostly by non-Maronite Christians, and Arab nationalism remained the preferred narrative for the Sunnis; since the state's legitimacy arose from its non-interventionist policy, it was not capable of adopting a

[22] Kaufman (2004) argues that the Phoenicians as a people disappeared progressively through a "process of adaptation to the new political reality" of the Greek and Roman dominions (4); just as the Aramaic dialect disappeared from Mount Lebanon due to the process of acculturation following the Arab conquests.

preferred hegemonic narrative as such a move would threaten its purpose of existence as an arbiter among its diverse society.

Lebanon's ethnic entrepreneurs that worked on the dissemination of the Phoenician narrative were active and most influential in the period preceding the formation of Greater Lebanon in 1920 up until the period before the beginning of the Lebanese civil war.[23] It existed at a time of Maronite political dominance within the state, and its purpose was to undermine the competing ideological narrative and legitimize the creation of the Lebanese state with its new territory, form of government and population. It was a movement, independent from the state, led by the country's intellectuals and religious intelligentsia, and its purpose was the ideological propagation of a Lebanese nation that coexists within an independent territorial state, and its battlefield was the literary and intellectual arena of the historians, philosopher and writers of the time. The movement set the first phase of Lebanism, as its non-organized and leaderless members set the ideological framework of "us" vs. "them", and engaged in a national ideological dialogue with the intelligentsia of the opposing camps (Armstrong: 2002). Their goal was to set Lebanon within a territorial and an ideological enclave that would preserve its cultural independence from the rest of the Arab world (Ramos-Zayas: 2003).

Imagining the nation:

In this next section, I will discuss the most influential intellectuals that adopted Phoenicianism and articulated its reasoning through their writings and the communication of their ideas to a people that was seeing a territorial entity coming to life without a unifying national ethos. Their campaign consisted of targeting the ruling class through literature and

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[23] With the civil war, the narrative creation process was transferred to the militia leaders and their entourage.

poetry, and their repertoire consisted of myth making and romanticizing the Phoenician past, the historical role of Mount Lebanon as a sacred refuge for minorities, the Christians in particular, and the emphasis on the peculiarities of Lebanese society, climate, history, language, etc. hence shining the light on the differences between Lebanon and the rest of the Arab world. The Maronite Church, the primary educator of the common Maronite individual, the intellectuals and the members of the high ruling society, and the agreement among the different speakers of the main principles of the narrative and its objectives, provided the movement and its message the worthiness needed. Phoenicianism, as the narrative that justifies Lebanism, was important in that it asserts the distinctiveness and hence the right for self-rule and self-determination of the Lebanese population. Philip Hitti's book *Lebanon in history* that was printed in the early 40s provided the backbone for the movement as it legitimized the claims of the neo-Phoenicians that Lebanon's history is over 6000 years old (Khalifah: 1997); Hitti's worthiness as a historian gave the movement the structure for a stronger ideological argument. Lebanist intellectuals competing for the sentiments of the Lebanese who were exposed to a number of national narratives in the absence of a unifying state narrative.

Charles Corm was a francophone Maronite from Beirut's haute bourgeoisie who dedicated his life to the dissemination of Phoenician Lebanon; he was praised by some and rebuked by others for his attachment and over exploitation of the Phoenician narrative (Kaufman: 2004; Traboulsi: 2013). Corm expressed himself in an impeccable French, a language that was familiar to the elite and intellectuals but that was not accessible to the common man (Kaufman: 2004), one of reason that made his efforts for the promotion of Phoenicianism limited to the upper-class circle. Corm's ideology was of complete fondness and admiration to the French, which made his ideas unacceptable, in their entirety, to Lebanese thinkers that embraced Lebanon's Arabism or

were looking for a narrative that would not isolate the majority of the Lebanese population, that still used Arabic as their primary mean of communication;[24] he was also criticized by both Muslim and Christians thinkers that were working on downplaying Phoenicianism and emphasizing Lebanon's Arab identity (Kaufman: 2004; Traboulsi: 2013). Still it is important to not undermine the importance and the influence of Corm's writings and ideas within what Gramsci would call the "ruling class" circle that shared and adopted Corm's Phoenician Lebanese identity. Corm went as far as to ally with the Zionist movement in Palestine, and as was argued by Eliahu Epstein, it was Zionism that activated the Maronite search for a glorified distant past that is conditionally attached to a geographical entity (Kaufman: 2004: 158, 159).[25]

Michel Chiha had reservations towards Corm's Phoenician narrative that he saw as *one* vehicle in the nation creation process, as nations need the legacy of a cohesive past and the Phoenician past was "a past remote enough and great enough" (Kaufman: 2004: 162).[26] The past needed to be so ancient and mysterious that it can be utilized as needed without being disputed. Kamal Salibi in his *"House of many mansions"* rejects the Phoenicians' narrative emphasizing on the mere geographical unity between the Phoenicians and the Lebanese, and none of the historical and cultural elements that were narrativized by the New Phoenicians (Kaufman: 2004: 168). While both Chiha and Salibi denounced the Maronite narrative of Phoenicianism, they still

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[24] "By the 1930s most educated Lebanese were fluent in French as well as Arabic, but Arabic remained their prime means of expression" (Kaufman: 2004: 143).

[25] Corm's Zionist relations were not common at his time as most Lebanese sympathized with the Palestinian cause, a matter that will change in the 1960s and throughout the Lebanese civil war, as Palestinians become the enemies of the Maronite community.

[26] Chiha had a substantial influence on the Lebanese political system as he participated in the drafting of the first constitution of Greater Lebanon, among other societal and political activities that placed him within the circle of the most influential elite in Lebanon (Kaufman: 2004). Chiha was a Chaldean Catholic with Iraqi origins, which shows the precipitation of Phoenicianism amongst Beirut's haute bourgeoisie amongst the different Christian sects, and some non-Christians as well (Kaufman: 2004).

each in his way, adopted parts of the Phoenician narrative (Kaufman: 2004), which professes to the strength of that narrative and its hegemonic role among Lebanon's intellectuals. Chiha embraces in his writings the legitimacy of Lebanon as a separate cultural unit located in a geographical setting, which since the time of the Phoenicians gave it the "mission" of being the point of encounter amongst the three continents that are joined by the Mediterranean that is characterized by its peacefulness and moderation (Kaufman: 2004; Khalifah: 1997). It has historically been "the land of refuge", the land of minorities that took in the displaced that faced persecutions since the beginning of time (Kaufman: 2004: 164). It is this Mediterranean openness and Lebanon's historical peculiarity of welcoming refugees, that rejects the direct association of the Lebanese with any one civilization, as the inhabitants of that piece of land are unique in their diversity and ethnic heterogeneity (Kaufman: 2004: 165). Chiha, tactfully, marketed an identity that rejects all other identities, in favor of the creation of an independent Lebanese political unit. His ideas were powerful amongst the non-Maronites that were alienated from the Maronite nationalistic narrative with Mount Lebanon as its geographical nucleus and the Maronites as its architects (Kaufman: 2004: 168).

Said Aql[27] shared Chiha's vision of Lebanon as having a "mission" and its civilizational peculiarity as it holds within its spirit a "truth" that could not be dislodged by socio-political definition of what is a nation (Kaufman: 2004: 174, 175); that "truth" is a mixture of Phoenician humanism and monotheism, and later Christian beliefs that manifest love and peace, all of which started in the land of Phoenicia and spread to the western world (Kaufman: 2004: 175, 176). Aql through his literature, revived mythological figures from the Phoenician past such as the

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[27] Said Aql is a Lebanese Christian Maronite poet and writer that was renowned in Lebanon and the Arab world.

Phoenician *Cadmus* that served to awaken nationalist feelings within the Lebanese as they were reminded of the heroism and resilience of their imagined ancestors; *Cadmus's* symbolism aimed at legitimizing Lebanon as a nation that has existed for over 5000 years and that has been, and will keep, fighting for its existence (Kaufman: 2004: 177, 180).[28]

Corm and Aql were fearful of the Arabization of Lebanon post-independence; Corm expressed his disappointment in the term "Arab face" (Kaufman: 2004) that for the Sunnis at the time was a setback from their aspirations to belong to the Arab nation, which shows the polarization in opinion within the Lebanese dialectic of identity. Aql on the other hand states that in a conversation with Riad Solh[29] in 1943, the latter informed him of his plans to include that Lebanon is an Arab country in the introduction to the constitution, the former convinced him to change his mind on this sensitive issue and thus was the term "Arab face" and the constitution remained "clean" according to Aql (Dib: 2013: 464).

Linguistic exceptionalism and separatism:

The influence that the Arabic language holds as the sacred language of Islam led the Lebanists to turn to linguistic alternatives (Kaufman: 2004: 12). Lebanist entrepreneurs did not agree on one linguistic peculiarity for Lebanon, yet their efforts in the dissemination of alternatives to Arabic reflects their understanding of the role that language can play in imagining

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[28] Passages from *Cadmus:*
Mira the symbol of Lebanon:
And there is no truth unless we endure! (Kaufman: 2004: 178)
Europa the lost sister and the bearer of "the message of love":
I am my country, and Lebanon is a pledge! (Kaufman: 2004: 178)
Cadmus, the bearer of the message of wisdom:
We challenge the world, nations and tribes
And build—Everywhere we yearn—a Lebanon. (Kaufman: 2004: 179).
[29] Independent Lebanon's first Sunni Prime Minister.

what Anderson (1991) called "particular solidarities" within national movements. Corm, in his attempt to resist Arabic as the dominant language, imagined that the real Lebanese language is the ancient Phoenician, which the Lebanese can substitute with French and keep its "shadow" close to their heart since it can no longer manifest itself on their lips (Kaufman: 2004: 151, 152).

Ottoman dominion accelerated the Arabization process of, what Phares called "the Aramaic Lebanese Christians", as they were obliged to learn Arabic and speak it as all administrative and economic matters were conducted in "the language of the invader" (Phares: 1995: 45).[30] In an attempt to save the sanctity of their Syriac language, the Maronite monks translated Syriac religious texts into "brother Christian tongues" such as Latin, French and Italian, as their language was being "asphyxiated" (Phares: 1995: 45); preservation of the sacredness of liturgical language was a manifestation of what Scott (1985) called "weapons of the weak", as in public Arabic was used as the expressive tool and in private an effort was being made to maintain the Christianity of the language and to resist the language of Islam. Maronite intellectuals have argued that the Lebanese Christian's relationship with the French language was not a colonial product of the French mandate, but it has deeper roots in the relationship between the Maronite church and the French, and "as a means of cultural and religious preservation" (Phares: 1995: 45).

Lebanist ethnic entrepreneurs struggled between both French and Arabic at the outset of the creation of Greater Lebanon and in the years following Lebanon's independence. Embracing French, as a national language would alienate the majority of the Lebanese that are most comfortable with Arabic, especially within the rural Mount Lebanon; it was solely Lebanon's Beirutis that were comfortable with French as their first language (Kaufman: 2004). For

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[30] The Maronites of Mount Lebanon spoke Syriac up until the 17th century (Phares: 1995: 45).

Arabophones like Yusuf Al-Saouda, among others, the struggle was to communicate the adoption of Arabic as a language, while precipitating Phoenicianism and rejecting Arabism (Kaufman: 2004: 170). Said Aql introduced a whole new boldness to this discussion; as an arabophone, who perfected the use of the Arabic language through his literature, and a Lebanese nationalist, he suggested and lobbied to transform the Lebanese colloquial dialect into Lebanon's formal literary national language (Kaufman: 2004; Dib: 2013), an effort that remained futile given the inability of the state to adopt one national agenda that would serve the interest of one faction over the other. The aim of this endeavor was to "expropriate" Arabic from its Islamic origin (Kaufman: 2004: 173). Aql justifies his campaign by arguing that a dead language, as defined by the dictionary, is a language that is no longer spoken, and since Arabic is not spoken, it is a dead language, whereas Lebanese is spoken and alive just like the Iraqi or Egyptian dialect (Dib: 2013: 462).[31] Aql did not object to teaching Arabic, just like Latin, a dead language, could be taught, yet both are dead languages and are used merely by scholars and researchers (Dib: 2013: 462).[32] He argued that language is necessary to the determination of the national identity, and its absence has allowed for the "pollution" of the minds of the young Lebanese with foreign ideologies, as the relationship between language and identity is very intimate (Dib: 2013: 463, 464). Chiha took a moderate tone and was one of the entrepreneurs that aimed at reflecting the peculiarity of Lebanese culture through its diversity; his attempt was to not guarantee the Arabs cultural superiority while attempting to include them in the national project. Chiha emphasized the uniqueness of the inhabitants of that geographical entity whom since the time of the Phoenicians were characterized with openness that has been manifested through their multi-

[31] He adds that the French write what they speak, the English write what they speak and not what Shakespeare spoke, and the Israelis did not use the Torah's Hebrew but a modern spoken Hebrew and made it an official language (Dib: 2013: 462).

[32] Aql himself was a master of the Arabic language.

linguistics, and while Arabic is one of the languages of modern Lebanon, it is not, and should not be, the national language (Kaufman: 2004: 164, 165). Sélim Abou (2003) affirms in his *Les Libertés* the necessity of the continuation of the multi-linguist tradition in Lebanon for a people to coexist peacefully, no one language should be enforced on the other, especially that this language, Arabic, has deep religious connotations; he argues that in a country like Lebanon, where religion not ethnicity, is the primary mean of identification of individuals, one religious group should not impose its religious symbols on the other.

The sacredness of the land and rootedness:

Mount Lebanon is the historical home of the Maronite "nation" and the proclaimed birthplace of Lebanese identity by the Maronite Church and intelligentsia (Dib: 2013). Mount Lebanon's historical autonomy is another legitimating factor for Lebanon's creation within its modern borders as Mount Lebanon historically had an autonomous political economy and cultural history (Ayubi: 2008: 115). The Maronites ended up in Mount Lebanon as a result of their fleeing Byzantine and Muslim persecution in Syria and Iraq in the 7th century and have emerged more as a tribe than as a church and started establishing contacts with Rome since 1215; thus eventually transforming from an Eastern Church to followers of the Catholic papacy (Ayubi: 2008:115).

Charles Corm in his series of poems in *La Montagne Inspirée*[33] roots his inspiration for his Lebanist Phoenicianism from Mount Lebanon in his imagining of the Lebanese as one people with deep-rooted attachment to their fathers the Phoenicians who demonstrated their superiority to other cultures through their intellect and not the power of their arms (Kaufman: 2004: 145). He uses Christian mythology to express and create scenery from the past of Lebanon that

[33] The Sacred Mountain

elevates Phoenician and Christian triumphs, so as to emphasize their connectedness (Kaufman: 2004: 146, 147). He clearly tells "his Muslim brother" that he, meaning the Christian, is the *true* Lebanese, an it is *my* faith that symbolizes *my* identity as Lebanese, in his infamous passage:

"Mon Frère musulman, comprenez ma franchise:
Je suis le vrai Liban, sincère et pratiquant
D'autant plus libanais que ma Foi symbolise
Le cœur du pélican" (Kaufman: 2004: 146).

Corm emphasizes in his writings the geographical sites that hold Phoenician and Christian identities in his imaginings of their connectedness: The temple of Baalbek, the Phoenician name for one of their deity, The holy valley of Qadisha, that also still holds a Phoenician name and that represents the Maronite rootedness to Lebanon as it is the place where the first Maronite monks took refuge and turned into a monastic heaven, and the Ibrahim river that symbolizes the love story between the Phoenician God Adonis and the Goddess Astarte (Kaufman: 2004: 146, 149). Corm, like other Lebanese thinkers, married Lebanon to the Mediterranean and divorced him from the rest of the Arab world; Lebanon's marriage to the Mediterranean locates him within the Christian Western world as opposed to the Arab Muslim East. While Chiha did not emphasize Mount Lebanon's sacredness in his Christian national narrative, he emphasized the sacredness of Phoenicia, of the Land of Canaan, that Jesus visited throughout his travels (Kaufman: 2004: 166). Given his Christian non-Maronite background, he placed Beirut, the Mediterranean city, and not the villages of Mount Lebanon, at the heart of independent Lebanon (Kaufman: 2004: 168).[34]

Arabism as the ideological "other":

[34] Given that he was not a Maronite and had no emotional attachment to the Lebanese village.

Arabism is a movement that began in the end of the 19th century and beginning of 20th century with the advancement of the West and the inability of the East under the Ottoman Empire to keep up with these advancements (Dawn: 1973). The fall of the Ottoman Empire after World War I led the Arabs to repackage Arabism as a movement that will resurrect the Arab nation from its stillness and reclaim their special status in the East and in particular the Islamic nation (Dawn: 1973). While Arab Muslims were concentrated on resurrecting the glory of Islam, the Intellectual Christians of the East were struggling between embracing Arab nationalism and its Islamic roots (Dawn: 1973) or as in the case of Lebanon, rejecting the regionalization of identity and localizing nationalism through the creation of Lebanese nationalism and the realization of their dream of a land for the Christians, in particular the Maronites, where they can exercise their political freedom. Christian intellectuals through their writings remind their readers of the Islamic origins of Arab nationalism so as to reject the secular face that has been created to attract the Christians to adopting Arab unity.

Scholars generally saw Lebanism as a reaction to Arab nationalism it generated amongst both Christians and Muslims in the Arab east; the idea that it emanates from “socio-political realities within Lebanon” was disregarded (Kaufman: 2004: 6). Kaufman (2004) argues that Phoenicianism preceded Arabist sentiments within Lebanese circles, as Arabism, as Dawn (1973) demonstrated, did not spread until the fall of the Ottoman empire post World War II. Still Arabism did have a role in the development of Lebanism and Lebanese Christian sentiment and narrative throughout the 20th century. Lebanese Christian intellectuals expressed Syrian and Arab sentiments in the period before and after the spread of Lebanism and the lobbying for independent Lebanon (Kaufman: 2004: 7).

The “other” in the Christian collective memory:

Antoine Najm (1992) in his booklet on the *"The people's identity and the state's identity"* in Lebanon aims at showing the differences between the two identities, as the state is an artificial creation that could seize to exist.[35] The people's identity, or the group's identity in this case, according to Najm, is in a constant dialectic but does not undergo a conscious change; it changes over a long period of time with the historical changes that it withstands (9). Najm's aim is to show that while the Lebanese state might be an Arab state, the people of Lebanon are sharply divided between the Muslims that believe that Lebanon is an extension to the Arab-Muslim world, and the Christians that see the Arab Islamic world as the *other* as history has stored a sense of mistrust and worry in the Christian collective memory (10, 11).[36] The divisions among the two groups were mostly manifested by their reaction to the European presence in the Middle East, as while the Muslims saw it as a catastrophe and a violation of their self-governance, the Christians welcomed that presence as a relief from subservience and a liberating agent that will give them a political presence that would place them among the free nations (Najm: 1992: 11). Najm (1992) expresses the dichotomous understanding of the concept of sovereignty, as he claims Muslims do not see Arab interference in Lebanese affairs as treading on its sovereignty to highlight what he sees as sharp differences between the two groups (13). He expresses the Christian fear of living under the "*Dhimmis* status"[37] and thus their fight for an independent

[35] Antoine Najm is a Maronite philosopher, thinker and ideologue that inspired the Phalangists and later the Lebanese Forces.

[36] The Taif Accord that ended the civil war changed the identification of the Lebanese state as a nation with an "Arab face", to an Arab state.

[37] The "status of Dhimmis" as explained by Najm: 1) inequality between the Muslim and the Non-Muslim; 2) The inability of a non-Muslim to a governance position, or any influential political position; 3) placing Sharia rule above any other law; 4) The non-Muslim is forbidden to object to rule of the Muslim majority; 5) The non-Muslim male is forbidden to marry a Muslim woman, whereas a Muslim man can marry a non-Muslim woman; 6) Superiority over non-Muslims (Najm: 1992: 47).

Lebanon especially at a time when Islamic doctrines are at the center of the political conversation amongst both the Shia and the Sunnis (13, 14).

The "*Dhimmis* status" of minorities in the Middle East after the Islamic conquests is deeply entrenched in the Christian collective memory.[38] Walid Phares (1995) in *Lebanese Christian Nationalism: The rise and fall of an ethnic resistance,* begins his study by reminding the readers of the brutality of the Islamic Conquests and their effect on the Christian identity in the Middle East; he describes the process of Islamization through which the non-Muslim had to choose between converting to Islam, paying *Jizya* in return for practicing his faith, or conversion by the sword (Phares: 1995: 13, 14). Phares describes the process of Arabization in the Middle East that was resisted by the minorities; of the Christian groups that resisted that process of assimilation and succeeded to some extent, are the Christians of Lebanon, the Maronites in Particular (Phares: 1995: 18), and the Maronite struggle for creating a national home is a struggle to maintain political independence and the golden principle of liberty and self-rule as any existence within an Arab environment under Muslim rule will lead to rendering the Christians to the inferior status of second-class citizens.

The Maronites are the ones responsible for the creation of Lebanon as they transformed a geographical entity that was historically known as Lebanon, into a place where a group that identifies as Lebanese dwell (Najm: 1992: 16). That group, the Maronites, took refuge in the mountains of Lebanon thirteen centuries ago looking for the freedom to practice their religious rituals and refusing slavery and living as inferiors to others; the Maronites sanctified the Mountains of Lebanon because it protected them and gave them the liberty that was rare outside

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[38] Under the "Dhimmis Status" the non-Muslim would be given the choice to maintain his belief system in return of a tax or *Jizya;* non-Muslims become second-class citizens and loose their social and political rights (Phares: 1995: 11).

its borders, and allowed them to be rebels and fight for their existence (Najm: 1992: 16). The existence of Lebanon is directly related to its Christian population, as Lebanon as an entity would not have been, had it not been for the Christian presence on its geography (Najm: 1992: 17). Their attachment to their Christian Lebanese identity, according to Najm (1992), does not stem from their hate of the Arabs, but from their fear for the liberties and their fear of subservience under Muslim rule (17).[39]

On the cover of Antoine Najm's (1992) booklet titled *"A letter to the Christians"*, Hassan Nasrallah is quoted saying in 1987: "Lebanon and this region is for Islam and the Muslims. And it must be governed by Islam and Muslims". This statement is a reminder to the Christians of Lebanon of what loosing the battle would mean for them. It would mean political suicide and subordination to an Islamic rule. Najm's *letter* has a message to those Lebanese Christians that adhere to Lebanese nationalism that manifested itself with the Christian militias during the years of the civil war, and the Lebanese Christians that embraced other ideologies like Arabism, Syrianism, and Communism, etc. Najm explains a Christian's embracing of Arabism, an ideology with deep Islamic roots, as an evidence of their minoritarian and inferior status in the Arab east (6). Najm quotes Michel Aflaq's[40] say that "Arabism is a body, its spirit is Islam"[41] (8) to extend on the relationship between Arabism and Islam, as both developed together and could not be separated, and to emphasize the weakness of a secular Arabism that was disseminated primarily by Arab Christians. Najm (1992) also quotes Antoun Saade,[42] saying that "Islam has

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[39] The example of the Copts that live as second-class citizens in a Muslim society came up in the speeches of Bashir Gemayel that aimed at reminding the Christians of Lebanon that loosing the battle means loosing your political superiority.
[40] Michel Aflaq is a Syrian philosopher and Arab nationalist that converted from Christianity to Islam and founded the Syrian *Baath* party (Phares: 1995: 15).
[41] He is also known for saying: "Islam is to Arabism what bones are to flesh" (Phares: 1995: 15).
[42] Saade was a Christian Syrian nationalist.

joined us: there are those that Islamized through the bible and others that Islamized through the Quran…Islam has joined us and tied us as one nation" (14). Najm takes this statement as submissive and surrender to the will of the majority.

Lebanon's Maronites succeeded in creating Greater Lebanon and Lebanese nationalism, while facing Muslim opposition to the new entity and to its new constitution (Najm: 1992: 10, 11).[43] Najm (1992) also references Egyptian Christians stating that Christianity is their religion and Islam is their nation (21); reminds Arab Christians that their submissiveness to Arabism and Islam has not led to their acceptance and incorporation as equals in society, as exemplified by the Copts in Egypt that are still persecuted and oppressed within the Islamic society, that they stood with, against western intervention in Egypt (22). Najm rejects that attitude of surrender to the will of the majority and calls Christians to fight for their interests; he calls on them to teach the Christian individual that he has the right to exist in that land and the right to be an equal (26). The Muslim majority, according to Najm (1992), has led Christian identity to transcend the spiritual-faithful side and to take shape as a social, national political Christian identity; it is that awareness of the danger of the majority, especially with the spread of political Islam that led Christians to enclose on their self and reassert their Christian identity (28).

Reminiscing the Mardaite State and political autonomy in the Maronite collective memory:

Phares (1995) argues that "the Lebanese Christian resistance" is in reference to that group of people that have historically built on each other's efforts to maintain a resistance against the process of Arabization and the assimilation within the Arab land and nation (29). That resistance has irredentist plans and has throughout its existence fought to achieve territorial and political independence from the rest of the Arab world; the ultimate intention is the creation of a national

[43] The constitution was written in 1926.

home for the Christians that inhabited the area known as Lebanon (Phares: 1995). Phares (1995) holds that the Christian settlement in Mount Lebanon in the 7th century is the beginning of the national project of creating a Christian homeland (32). He describes the three stages of the *Mardaite* state that began in 676 A.D. and lasted until 1305 A.D. Throughout these 7 centuries the Maronites successfully resisted Arab incursions and settlements, the wrath of the Byzantine Constantinople, and maintained their territorial and political independence, up until the end of the European crusades (Phares: 1995)[44]. The Maronite cooperation with the crusades led to fierce *Mamluk* offensive with the aim of "eliminating the Christian state in Mount Lebanon"; the incursion put an end to the Mardaite state and led to the Christian suffering from oppression as they became a "*Dhimmi* population" after they enjoyed independence and autonomy for almost 7 centuries (Phares: 1995: 38). Phares (1995) argues that it is the memory of the Mardaite state and the longing to revive their political and cultural independence that has fueled Lebanese Christian nationalism in the 19th and 20th century, and gave them the "political legitimacy" to claim that territorial entity as their national home (39, 40). The *Mamluks* divided Mount Lebanon and rendered its Christians inferior politically, economically and socially which has remained ingrained in the collective memory of Lebanon's Christians (Phares: 1995: 43).

Maronitism as religious nationalism:

The Maronite church and its Patriarchs played a major role in the creation of Lebanon as the Maronite Catholic *presence* in the Middle East depended on this entity, and their role as the protectors of this entity endured during the war years as they worked on preserving Lebanon's territorial and ideological independence (Dib: 2013). The Maronite clergy, along with the

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44 Ironically in the 7th century it was the Byzantines that launched an attack on the *Mardaites* as an entente deal with the Muslim *Umayyads* (Phares: 1995: 33).

movement's ethnic entrepreneurs, weaved Christianity with nationalism so that serving the nation and dying for the homeland was transformed into a religious duty and an act of faith, and played a role in establishing the worthiness of the Christian nationalist movement. The Maronite Patriarch preached that "patriotism is a religious practice" in 1919, the period when the Maronites were lobbying with France for the creation of Greater Lebanon (Kaufman: 2004: 11). The Maronite church refers to the Maronites as a "nation" that has survived and tolerated together centuries of persecution and collective suffering (Mahfouz: 2009). "The history of the Maronites also makes up all the history of Lebanon, this country which has been associated with the Maronite church since its birth in order to show the whole world what "resistance" is, and what is a true refusal!" (Mahfouz: 2009: preface).

The Maronite church was born out of the monastery of Saint Maron, that was initiated in Syria, and that announced it's independence from the Church of Antioch in the 8th century at a time when Syria was getting invaded by the Arabs, and the patriarchal seat of Antioch remained empty for half a century (Mahfouz: 2009: 17). The Maronite monks and their community, that became known as the Maronites, fled the persecution in Syria and took refuge in the Mountains and valleys of Lebanon, so that as Mgr. Mahfouz (2009) describes it "Lebanon thus became a place of refuge for the Maronites and the center of their community, so that in time the nation (country) and the Maronite church were looked upon as one and the same thing" (18). The Maronite church was historically built around a community, as Maronites existed for 300 years before the church declared its independence from Antioch, therefore "The Maronite spirit is both theological and socio-national" (Mahfouz: 2009: 19). The Maronites spoke Syriac, which today is considered a dead language that still lives in the Maronite liturgies and in some Christian

communities in the Middle East (Mahfouz: 2009: 23).[45] Monseigneur Mahfouz (2009) in his *Short history of the Maronite Church* describes Lebanon as the land of the ancestral Phoenicians and its mountains as Lebanon's "strength" and "reason for pride" (27). He tells the story of Lebanon the bridge of civilizations, the Phoenicians that invented the alphabet, and brings out the biblical passages that mention Lebanon and its cedars to emphasize the sacredness of this land that was visited by the Jesus (28) and later by Saint Mark who describes in his gospel his travels throughout the towns of Tyr and Sidon (29). He calls the Phoenician land, "the land of the gods" and describes its close relation with religion, as today it remains filled with "churches and sanctuaries" (28). Of these sanctuaries is the monumental statue of "our Lady of Lebanon" that stands on the mountain and looks down on the city of Jounieh.[46] Mahfouz calls Lebanon a "holy land" because it has always been the refuge of persecuted communities and it being one of the first birthplaces of Christianity after Palestine (29).[47] The rhetoric of the role of the Maronites in creating Lebanon is evident as the two are seen the two sides of the same coin, and the one could not have existed without the other; Christianity preceded the Maronites into the lands of the Phoenicians, yet its was the Maronites that Christianized the Mountains that had remained pagan until their migration (Mahfouz: 2009: 32); their relationship with their "country" is unshakable as they have made it "the stronghold of their faith, their identity, and their liberty" (Mahfouz: 2009: 36).

The Phalangists and the Palestinians:

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[45] The Maronite liturgy is no longer celebrated fully in Syriac; Monseigneur Mahfouz regrets the latinization and the Arabization of the mass as it lost its oriental flavor as the former made it loose its oriental flavor and the latter tempered with its Syriac tradition (24).

[46] Sandra Mackey (2006) stated in her *Lebanon: A house divided,* that the presence of the statue of "Our Lady of Lebanon" "boldly announces 'This is a Christian land'" (28).

[47] The Monseigneur remarks that Lebanon's status as the land of refuge has caused it trouble in the past in reference to the Palestinian refugees.

The Phalangist *Kataeb* party was established in 1936 by Sheikh Pierre Gemayel, as a youth group, with the goal of educating national sentiments (Khalifah: 1997; Harik: 1994). It grew in the 70s with an overwhelmingly Maronite membership (Picard: 2002: 103). The Phalangists adopted the Phoenician narrative and became one of the first Christian Maronite organizations that led the conversation against Arabism, and to arm the Christian street against Palestinian aggression. While the Phalangists claimed that their identity was Lebanese and their ideology was a united Lebanese nation, it was led by a Maronite feudal family that advocated Maronite supremacy as guaranteed by the confessional political system; their Lebanist nationalism, was like that of the rest of the claimants of the movement: Christian first. Lebanese nationalism meant Maronite supremacy and any attack on the Maronite leadership and ideology was a direct attack on Lebanon (Dib: 2013). Within the Lebanese national movement, Lebanism equaled Maronitism and any counter-argument was an act of treason.

The Christian *Zu'ama*, that had hegemonic powers over the Christian street and voiced the Maronite community, rejected the Palestinian presence on the Lebanese territory and its functioning as "a state within a state" and the Arab interventions in Lebanon's internal affairs (Picard: 2002: 102). They feared that the communitarian system that guaranteed their interest and role in the state could be jeopardized and that Lebanon would get dragged in the problems of the Arab Middle East especially the Arab-Israeli conflict. They enjoyed political supremacy under the current political system that guaranteed their power and were not willing to give it up.

The *Kataeb* started clashing with the Palestinian Liberation Organization[48] in 1970, then in 1975 the party leader Pierre Gemayel released a memorandum demanding that the president of

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[48] Post 1967 Arab-Israeli war and its disastrous effects on the Arab world, the Palestinian Liberation Organization rose as "a new generation of militants committed to armed struggle against Israel" (Al-Khazen: 2000: 106).

Lebanon to pull out the PLO from the south and put it under army control, the purpose of which was to get the army to take sides with the Lebanese Front (Picard: 2002: 103). The *Kataeb* were claiming the defense of the state yet were attempting to grab the state, and faced an armed revolution with another thus beginning the process of the militarization of the Christian national movement. The Phalangist party presented itself as the protector of Lebanon's sovereignty and considered itself the sole group entitled to make up for the weakness of the state after the 1969 Cairo agreement that legitimized Palestinian operations on the Israeli border (Picard: 2002: 103).[49] The Cairo Agreement was allowing a revolutionary armed presence within the Lebanese territory, which in itself as a concept contradicted with the concept of the state as the only coercive apparatus within a territory. The state by signing this agreement undermined the importance of its monopoly over the use of violence by allowing foreign entities to hold arms within its boundaries, thus the militarization of its society was a the direct result of its legitimating a foreign armed presence on its territory.

Al-Khazen (2000) called the PLO armed presence in Lebanon "a powerful divisive force" that radicalized Maronite opinion and led Maronite leaders to join ranks to fight the Palestinian threat to Lebanon's sovereignty and "the physical and political security of the Christian community" (363); the revolutionary PLO "militarized" the Lebanese society by turning south Lebanon into a war zone with Israel in 1968, a warfare that spread to other parts of the country, including Beirut.

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[49] The Cairo agreement was an agreement between the PLO and the Lebanese government, the objective of which was for the Lebanese government to limit the areas of operation of the PLO to the south Lebanon-Israeli border. It gave Israel an excuse to retaliate against 13 Lebanese civilian airplanes as a warning for the Lebanese government to control PLO operations from Lebanon (Al-Khazen: 2000: 140). After 1967, South Lebanon became the scene of warfare between the PLO and Israel, though the Lebanese State was not at war with Israel; this armed struggle was enabled by the signed Cairo agreement with the PLO in 1969 (Al-Khazen: 2000:108). The PLO-Israeli armed conflict in the South led the militarization of the Shia as they took up arms against Israel because the government is unable to protect its civilians.

What was the “Palestinian revolution” for some, became the “Palestinian problem” for others and “accelerated communal and ideological mobilization” (Al-Khazen: 2000: 370).

The weak structure of the Lebanese state was completely paralyzed and failed to claim its hegemony over its territory and society. The country’s communal leaders/elite became militia leaders and each acted as a representative of “his own state”: defending its turf, allying with foreign states, extracting resources and building armies. The Lebanese state’s inability to monopolize violence within its territory allowed the strong societal forces to overrun the state organizations especially the army that was politicized and poorly institutionalized.

Lebanon’s enemies:

Najm (1992) called the Palestinian cause a catastrophe that deepened the divide between Lebanon’s Muslims and Christians, as the latter saw it as their cause, and while post the 1948 war offered humanitarian aid to the Palestinians, they never felt an emotional attachment to Palestine (12). In fact, he states that the Israeli presence in the Middle East was generally seen as a balancing factor and a potential ally in dangerous threatening situations (12).[50] Said Aql referred to the Palestinian refugees as “polluters of Lebanese society” and their presence is a danger to Lebanon’s socio-political and cultural setting (Dib: 2013: 449; Traboulsi: 2013). Aql lead the establishment of a political party that turned into a Christian militia that “married the word to the gun”, as its members fought along other Lebanese nationalist militias at the outset of the civil war (Dib: 2013: 450). The party’s principle tenets were a belief in the “ideological trio:

[50] Note that Najm is writing in 1992 after the Christian militias allied with Israel in their war with the Palestinians and the Lebanese Left.

God, the Human, and Lebanon",[51] a Lebanon that is the extension of 7000 years[52] of civilization that gets manifested on the territorial space of 10,452 square kilometers (Dib: 2013: 450). One of the party's goals is to expel all foreign presence from Lebanon and the withdrawal of Lebanon from the Council of Arab Nations in order to restore its identity (Dib: 2013: 450). The booklet of the party stated that the civil war that began in 1975 is a Lebanese-Palestinian war and every Lebanese has to kill a Palestinian as: "our war is an annihilating war" (Dib: 2013: 451). The party imagined the creation of an "iron" state with immense powers such as what Mussolini achieved in Italy (Dib: 2013: 451).[53]

In 2001, Aql still refused to refer to the Lebanese conflict as a "civil war" as he claimed it was a "war on Lebanon" (Dib: 2013: 454). He argued that the Lebanese Army had the capability to prevent the extension of the PLO on Lebanese territory but the Lebanese government was given the red light to stop all attacks on the Palestinian guerillas; the Palestinians were given the authorization to use Lebanon as they please as Yasser Arafat publicly stated in 1976 that he will not allow the Lebanese Army to enter south of Lebanon (Dib: 2013: 454).[54] It was this reality of the state's weakness that led to the resilience of the nationalist militias to take up the role of the defenders of Lebanon's sovereignty (Dib: 2013: 455). Aql revealed the American plan to "ship"

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[51] The party also believed that western civilization is rooted in Phoenician Lebanon and not in Hellenic Greece as is assumed (Dib: 2013: 450), an important detail to the party's founder who was transformed from an intellectual to a national activist.

[52] The rhetoric of the historical past of the Phoenicians was inconsistent as it kept flowing between 5000, 6000, and 7000 years back.

[53] Of the projects that this strong state would take: Annul the foreigner's right to own property in Lebanon, and the annulling of all naturalization (Dib: 2013: 451).

[54] Aql expressed his disappointment of the unavailability of even one Palestinian intellectual, from writers to poets, that would take a role in expressing dissent over Arafat and the PLO's policies in Lebanon; thus Lebanese intellectuals should not play a role in expressing sympathy towards the Palestinians (Dib: 2013: 457).

the Maronites to the United States as an answer to the question of Lebanon (Dib: 2013: 456).[55] He rejected any outside assistance and any outside identities;[56] he compared Lebanon to God: God as self-sufficient being, once he reaches out outside himself, he renounces his omnipotence (Dib: 2013: 456).

Maronitism and the resistance narrative:

As Lebanon's Maronites saw that their political dominance was threatened by the militarized presence of the Palestinian armed groups, and in the face of the impotence of the state in dealing with military activities on its territory, the movement transformed its repertoire from the mysticism of the Phoenician forefathers and the high culture of the peaceful Mediterranean into a militant armed Christian resistance with a sacred cause driven by its religious and political Maronitism. The time came when cultural peculiarism of the Lebanese needed to be enriched with a "liberation theology" that would transform death into an act of faith. In a society where nationalism has multiple definitions within the different religious and sectarian communities, each creates a set of narratives and symbols that would mobilize the respective communities; "…the conflation of religious devotionalism and community activism cries out for individuals to be 'good believers' and 'good citizens' simultaneously" (Shaery-Eisenlohr: 2008: 30). Religious nationalism was not peculiar to the Maronite community in a country where the state failed to create a national ideology, as it was a successful strategy used by Lebanon's religious communities.

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[55] The plan as it is known amongst the Maronite community was to ship Lebanon's Christians to North America and to offer their land to the Palestinians as a substitute home; consequently Israel would take over the Palestinian territories. Kissinger's plan to sell Lebanon was referenced by a number of Lebanese politicians; Raymond Edde declared in his interview with Kamal Dib that he was the first to expose the conspiracy (Dib: 2013: 469).

[56] Aql claimed that Lebanon should even reject the Pope and France's assistance (Dib: 2013: 456); this was of course an exaggeration that he was making to extract Lebanon from belonging to the Arab world.

The campaign in the militant phase of the movement was transformed from one aiming at the larger Lebanese society with all its factions, to the Christian Maronite community. The repertoire that emphasized the glorious peaceful and cultural past of the Phoenicians was placed aside and made way for the narrative of Maronite resistance and the long hard way the community crossed in the name of liberty and self-determination. The violent past and self-victimization were awakened in the collective communal memory, and the Maronite gun was re-awakened, as the Christian presence in the East was threatened once again. The beginning of the war was marked by a strong communal unity led by its clergy, its intellectual elite, and organization under the leadership of the community's feudal like families. That worthiness was accelerated by a large mobilization for military training and activism, and a display of arms that would later be emphasized after the triumph on the battlefield. Military superiority will be downplayed at the times of weakness when battle heroism gets attached to sainthood, as heaven awaits those that are brave enough to die for their sacred land.

Christian symbolism in the resistance narrative:

From religious connotations within the Phoenician movement, the Christian movement's ethnic entrepreneurs married their rhetoric to Christianity and used the people's primary identification as a tool of mobilization and control. Paul Andari's (1993) *My testimony* reflects the process of internalization of the resistance narrative which made the participant believe beyond doubt in the necessary correlation of fighting and dying for one's land and one's freedom as a religious duty that will be rewarded.[57] The participants in the civil war often compared the violent journey to freedom as Jesus's path to Golgotha which he took bearing his cross on his

[57] Andari is a northerner that became the deputy operations leader under the leadership of Samir Geagea (Andari: 1993: 125).

way to his death only to resurrect and defeat sin; they saw the civil war, or the war on Christians, as the hard long road through which they have to bear the painful cross only to defeat the enemy through battle on their land, and spiritually as they take their rightful seat in heaven.

Andari's (1993) *My testimony* is important to this study as he represents the young man that joined the militia out of choice, which reflects the hegemonic power of the Maronite community and the internalization of its message by its members. Andari also became a high army commander in the Lebanese Forces and through his writings played an entrepreneurial role in conserving the resistance narrative and adapting its rhetoric between the waves of success and defeat that the movement weathered. Andari (1993) begins by dedicating his book to "the martyrs and Saints that rose earth to the level of heaven, to those that engrave dignity with their injuries on Lebanon's forehead, to the mothers that bore heroism and sainthood, to all those that gave their life for freedom and faith, to the history and the future, to you my Lord, more than a confession" (5). This dedication summons the Maronite fusion of freedom with faith, and the preservation of the first as a manifestation of the second, and the sanctification of Lebanon, the Maronite heaven on earth.

Andari (1993) begins his book by describing the Palestinian trespasses on the Christian community as they held forts, abusively interrogated and kidnapped civilians, the attacks on a monastery and the "butchering" of three old monks, all of which drove him to quit his school and join the Christian militia trainings (24). He describes how as a militiaman he witnessed Armed Palestinians marching in their military suits staring at him and his comrades with loathing stares (25). Andari repeats throughout his book his fearlessness as he was continuously subjected to dangerous settings; he even expresses his surprise at his cold response and lack of emotion to his brother's death in the battlefield. He situated the events he was living in the context of his "good

Friday" which is his journey on earth (30). Andari describes how on multiple occasions during his service in the Lebanese Forces, he was on a mission to rescue civilians by transporting them our of their homes and towns, and the refusal of the people to leave their homes as they all gather inside their church, willing to die for their dignity and their faith, praying and chanting, awaiting the aggressors.

Andari the fighter describes his experience on his way to his first battle as he held "his bullets in his pockets and his faith in his heart", which began with a cold feeling that turned into "the human instinct called courage and heroism" (37). He referred to the funeral of a fallen soldier as "the martyr's wedding" during which a poem was recited depicting the soldier being recognized in heaven as a hero from Lebanon as his eyes are the color of the cedar; the poet goes on to tell heaven not to be afraid as for every fallen martyr, two hundred cedars will arise to stand in the face of the world (40).

Andari details to the reader every instance of aggression on civilians in particular in the Shouf region, where the assassination of the Druze leader Kamal Jumblat in 1977, was avenged by the killing of 177 Christian civilians (48), and other instances of attacks on Christian villages and the rampaging of its churches (52). Andari's recollection of these events reflects the Maronite collective memory as he describes his inability throughout these events to take out the war of 1860 out of his mind, as the Christian community was once again subjected to violent attacks on its population, as he witnessed massacres and the destruction of churches. Andari describes the scene of the people of Deir Al Qamar leaving their defeated town in 1983, describing them as each holding his metaphorical cross walking on the metaphorical path to Golgotha, each holding in his heart the sorrow of loosing loved ones and leaving their destroyed homes behind, and with their fleeing the mountain is sliding and loosing the solidity of its roots (165, 166). Andari tells

of the horrific scenes he saw under the siege of Deir Al Qamar; one particular story he tells of a young girl that approached him and asked him "to kill us before they get to us" (171), which reflects the will of the people to die.

With those remaining we will continue:

The communities and the combatants under siege would gather around events to commemorate their dead, and Andari repeats to the readers the speech that he recited on that day and which he titled "with those remaining we will continue";[58] he tells of a young boy that went into a church and saw Christ on the cross with open arms, and as he recollected in his mind the memory of blood and destruction of his town, and as he dreams of building a temple,[59] as his master has lost his temple,[60] the Master on the cross calls on the boy: "your wish will be granted if you understand that *no cross will be raised without the sword, and no sword will be victorious without the cross*" (179, 180). Andari has thus legitimized the armed resistance by imagining that the mission of his people is sacred, blessed, and most importantly a religious performance. Ironically, Andari (1993) ends his book by expressing the battle within him as he wanted to live a true Christian life and defend the Christian presence in the East, as he questioned the madness of the relation between war and Christianity, yet he conquers his thoughts by arguing that while he had to engage in acts that Jesus would reject, he entered the war as a Christian defending his land, and not as a warrior; he voices the paradox of choosing between living a pure Christian life under constant threats, and jeopardizing the Golden rules of the Christian faith for the sake of safeguarding one's existence (339).

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[58] A slogan used till today in the resistance rhetoric.
[59] In reference of the event at the temple when Jesus got angry at the merchants for stealing in the house of God.
[60] In reference to the destructed churches.

On the identity of the other, it changed from the Palestinians and their allies, to the Syrians with their ambitious goals of re-uniting Lebanon to Greater Syria. The Christian ethnic entrepreneurs portrayed the war as a war that was forced on “us” the victims of foreign aggressions, as Lebanon never launched an aggression against any other nation (Andari: 1993). Andari in reference to the assassination of Maya, the 4-year-old daughter of Bashir Gemayel, states that the war needs fuel, even If they were children, and that many have died, and many will follow (98).

Gemayel, in the battle for the town of Zahle in 1981 that left the Lebanese Forces under siege as the Syrians bombarded the town, offered the combatants the opportunity to defend the identity of Lebanon’s Bekaa: “heroes die and don’t surrender” (Andari: 1993: 116); he offered the price and the prize, death and heroism, and it was up to them to decide their fate. Gemayel repeatedly reminded his men in his speeches that many have died, and many are needed to die (Andari: 1993; Geha: 2009). Geagea adopted the same rhetoric of justifiable death in his speeches, as he repeated the slogan that will get engraved in the Christian collective memory: “Martyrdom for a cause is a thousand times better than living without a cause” (Andari: 1993: 187).

The battle for Qnat:

Qnat is a Maronite town located in the mountains of Northern Lebanon, that resisted Syrian aggression in 1980 and is significant to this study as it became one of the battles that proved the worthiness of the Lebanese Forces through the power of their arms and the ability of small number of fighters to fight the Syrian troops and delay the take over of the town until its civilians were transferred to nearer towns. As the Lebanese Forces were accused of being backed by Israel, the battle for Qnat was necessary to show its members what they accomplish when armed with resilience under the leadership Geagea, and to show the enemies of the military capabilities

of the militia (Hayek: 2013); that battle turned Geagea, the son of commoners, into a political leader and a member of the Maronite community's new elite.[61] The traditional leadership never accepted Geagea, and his popularity and military accomplishments and became a "problem" as he challenged the traditional notion of *Zu'ama* in Lebanon (Andari: 1993: 104). Qnat also represents the betrayal of the Maronites to one another, as the Zghortans were the ones that led the Syrians into Qnat and facilitated their plans.

The fallen ranks:

A year after the beginning of the war, as the Maronite leadership were planning on the unification of their forces a member of the National Liberal Party killed two members of the Kataeb party (Andari: 1993: 41). The feuds amongst the Maronite families and groups reflect the primordial kinship loyalties that even preceded sectarian and communal allegiance, a factor that prevented the union of the Maronite forces and weakened the worthiness of their claims within their own communities, and on the national and international level. The Frangieh clan of Zghorta allied with the Syrians and set up roadblocks in Christian towns (Andari: 1993: 63). Samir Geagea and his troops invaded the town of Ehden during a night raid that killed Tony Frangieh, the son of Sleiman Frangieh, and his family (Mackey: 2006). This tale is one of the darkest in the Maronite history and one that will always be referenced in an ideological debate against the Christian cause and the purity of the resistance; with it began what Andari (1993) called "self-suicide" (67). Regionalism and clanship were also reflected by the appointing of Samir Geagea, a combatant from the northern town of Bsharri to lead the northern division of the Lebanese forces, as they would be taking orders from a northerner like them (Andari: 1993: 64).

The post war resistance narrative:

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[61] He remains amongst the most revered leaders amongst the Lebanese Christian community, but also one of its most divisive members, as he would lead "the war of the brothers" at the end of the civil war.

The end of the civil war marked Maronite loss of its hegemonic political role and the disarmament of their militias. The Maronite community was left deeply divided as its leadership chose to engage in a power struggle as opposed to unifying their ranks under one banner. The Bishop Bshara Al Rai[62] announced in a sermon for the war victims that what hurts the most is “our historical death as a people, as a church, and as a country” (Andari: 1993: 329). The rhetoric was that of the success of the “other” in dividing the Christians and causing their defeat; the war was about abolishing the free Christian existence on “our” land. The failure of the Christian national movement did not impede the heroism and sainthood narrative of resilience, yet the expressive means of the group changed as they lost their literal weapons, and clutched through the “weapons of the weak” through which they engage in a “war of symbols” in their struggle to reassert their worthiness (Scott: 1985). Geagea in his speech on the last day of the existence of the armed resistance addressed his people by telling them “tonight we will take our guns off our shoulders, but our crosses will remain pushing down its heavy weight on our shoulders. We will continue our path to the Golgotha of the ruthless East. Martyrdom is our destiny” (Andari: 1993: 333).

The language of victimization was deepened within the Christian narrative as the power of “our” faith and the sacredness of “our” message needed to maintain itself while ridding itself from the power of the arms. The religious superiority needed to embrace the language of peace, and the struggle needed to continue with the power of the word and civil action. Al-Masira[63] in one of post-war issues titled its cover “No the war did not end. The Christians are not worn out”; the message was a refusal of the defeat that was caused by the 16-year civil war and to reaffirm, or remind the people, that the Maronite creed of freedom and self-rule will remain the driver for

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[62] He became the 77th Maronite patriarch in 2011.
[63] The Lebanese Force’s weekly magazine.

the Christian resistance, or else there will be no Lebanon (Saliba-Dagher: 1991). Lebanon was made to preserve Christian freedom in the east and Andari (1993) compared, in his imagining of its sacredness, its creation, to a marriage that could not by terminated by men, as "what God has joined let man not separate" (336).

Conclusion:

The Lebanese state collapsed in 1975 with the beginning of the civil war, and has not until this day regained its full authority over its territory. Today Hezbollah remains an armed military movement that acts as a state within the state; the Sunni community has been radicalized in recent years and took up arms in certain areas out of defiance for Hezbollah's power. The Christian militias were disarmed at the end of civil; the community has maintained its resistance rhetoric and the defense of its vision of Lebanon. With the Taif Accord, which ended the civil war, and the Syrian armed and political hegemony that lasted until 2005, Christian hegemony over the state came to an end and the power struggle shifted to manifest itself as a race between the Sunni and the Shia communities. Lebanon's communities will remain trapped within this power struggle circle as no one group can annihilate the presence of the other, and at the same time they are not capable of reaching a compromise on the identity of their state and a unified national narrative. Only a consensual agreement on secular government reforms and a clear definition of the role of the state and its narrative in regards to its hostile communities could begin the process of reconciliation and nation state building. Until then communal hegemonic ideological narrative will remain the dominant form of identification and Lebanon will remain a powder keg waiting to explode when one community amasses enough power to overpower the others.

The Christian community remains divided amongst its feudal like political parties, and the divisions have been increased after the bloody civil war that witnessed towards the end a war between the Lebanese Forces under the command of Samir Geagea and the Lebanese Army under the command of the General Michel Aoun. It created a schism within the community and

was enshrined in its memory, in particular the episodes of blood feuds between the members of the one family, as mothers saw their sons clash and fight on opposing camps. The house crumpled upon itself and the definition of “other” extended from the Arab, the Muslim, the Palestinian and the Syrian, to the Lebanese Christian from the “other” party, family, or region that is not “ours”. Lebanon today is no longer merely an association of communities and sects; Lebanon today is an association of social movements with opposing national narratives all attempting to grab the state and impose their notion of the function of the state and the identity of that small and very controversial entity called Lebanon.

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